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A “FUNDAMENTAL” PROBLEM: THE VULNERABILITY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSES IN CHAPTER 15 
AND THE MEANING OF § 1506 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code)1 in 2005 to 
provide clear procedures for American courts’ cooperation in cross-border 
bankruptcy cases.2 Chapter 15 provides a procedural framework for courts 
dealing with the bankruptcy of a multinational company, and it was intended to 
work within fundamental United States policies and existing case law.3 
Specifically, it provides for recognition of proceedings taking place in another 
country that have an impact on parties or property within the United States.4 In 
cases where there is a conflict between foreign law and United States law,5 the 
principle of international comity6 typically guides the court, and the law of the 
debtor’s country should control any ancillary proceedings in the United States.7 
Despite this presumption, courts should deny comity, and United States law 
should govern a chapter 15 proceeding, when granting comity would be 
manifestly contrary to public policy. Consider the following hypothetical: 
Happy Technology, Inc. (Happy) is a United States corporation dedicated 
to the manufacture and sale of semiconductors throughout the world. Happy 
holds a nonexclusive license to a United States patent, held by Mytech, Inc. 
(Mytech), that permits Happy to manufacture a critical component covered by 
 
 1 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2006). 
 2 See id. § 1501(a). 
 3 U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, at pt. 2, para. 20, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1997), available at http://www.uncitral. 
org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf [hereinafter MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY]. 
 4 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1), (3) (stating that the purpose of chapter 15 is to promote cooperation 
between courts of the United State and courts in foreign countries to foster the “fair and efficient 
administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors, and other interested 
entities, including the debtor”). 
 5 For the purposes of this Comment, the relevant U.S. law consists of title 11 of the United States Code. 
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to title 11. 
 6 “Comity” is defined as “[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different 
jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive and judicial acts.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed. 2009). 
 7 In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM, 2009 WL 4060083, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2009), 
aff’d in part, remanded in part, 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
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the patent. Mytech is a German technology company that holds thousands of 
patents, both in the United States and around the world. Unfortunately, 
Mytech’s business has not been properly managed, and it has declared 
bankruptcy in the German insolvency court. Hermann Wissenschaft, Mytech’s 
representative appointed by the German court, files a petition for recognition 
of the German insolvency proceeding as the foreign main proceeding under 
chapter 15, which the United States court grants. As part of its plan for 
reorganization, Mytech has chosen to reject the license with Happy pursuant to 
German insolvency law. Happy knew it would still be able to manufacture the 
component under American law but discovers, much to its dismay, that 
German law does not allow a licensee to continue using intellectual property 
once the license is rejected. The German court approves Mytech’s rejection. 
With no other statutory option, the United States court applies principles of 
international comity and prohibits Happy from continuing to use the 
technology under the Mytech license. Without the right to manufacture the 
critical component, Happy is no longer able to manufacture semiconductors. 
As a result, Happy must also file for bankruptcy.8 
As this hypothetical demonstrates, chapter 15 allows a foreign court to 
control the administration of a foreign debtor’s bankruptcy in the United States 
and provides a procedure for the cooperation with that foreign court. While it 
may seem as though chapter 15 compels an American court to follow a foreign 
court’s decisions, there is a narrow exception.9 Chapter 15 grants courts a 
limited amount of policy-based discretion in § 1506 when considering whether 
to grant a petition for recognition under chapter 15. Section 1506 allows a 
 
 8 These facts are based on those in Micron Technology, Inc. v. Qimonda AG (In re Qimonda AG 
Bankruptcy Litigation), 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010). The district court remanded the case for a consideration 
of whether applying German law to the patent licenses would be manifestly contrary to public policy. Id. at 
571. On October 28, 2011, the bankruptcy court, after a rehearing on the issue of whether § 1506 precluded the 
application of German insolvency laws, held that § 365(n) should control the treatment of the patent licenses. 
In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-SSM, 2011 BL 278371, at *33–34 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 28, 2011). 
However, the court focused on the question of whether applying German law would severely impinge on the 
value of a constitutional or statutory right. Id. at *29–30. The court found that the “failure to apply § 365(n) 
under the circumstances of this case and this industry would ‘severely impinge’ an important statutory 
protection accorded licensees of U.S. patents and thereby undermine a fundamental U.S. public policy 
promoting technological innovation.” Id. at *34. Therefore, the court held “that deferring to German law, to 
the extent it allows cancellation of the U.S. patent licenses, would be manifestly contrary to U.S. public 
policy.” Id. at *34. However, the court did not attempt to define what it means for a policy to be 
“fundamental,” a necessary consideration for whether foreign law would be “manifestly contrary to public 
policy.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172. Therefore, while this 
court reached the correct result based on the facts, it does not change the need for a definition of 
“fundamental.” 
 9 See 11 U.S.C. § 1506. 
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court to deny a foreign representative’s petition if granting recognition would 
be “manifestly contrary to . . . public policy.”10 Both chapter 15 and the United 
Nations Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) on which 
chapter 15 is based warn that this provision should be interpreted narrowly, 
restricting the exception to only apply in circumstances where a “fundamental 
policy” of the United States is threatened.11 This Comment will explain that 
advancing intellectual property growth is a fundamental policy of the United 
States, and licensing is a critical component of encouraging such innovation. 
Therefore, United States law should govern intellectual property12 licenses in 
cross-border insolvencies where foreign law fails to protect the rights of the 
licensee. Such foreign law should not be recognized pursuant to § 1506 
because doing so would introduce uncertainty into the licensing market and 
impede the development of science and technology in contravention of a 
fundamental policy of the United States. 
The fundamental policies of the United States guide the creation of 
domestic laws, including the Code. Specifically, American bankruptcy law 
protects the fundamental policy of encouraging the growth of intellectual 
property by protecting intellectual property licenses from the trustee’s power to 
reject executory contracts.13 Encouraging the growth of science and technology 
is a fundamental policy based in part on language in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 8 of the Constitution, which directs Congress to protect such growth by 
“securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries.”14 Congress created patent and 
copyright protections to encourage investment in developing science and 
technology; these protections provide an economic incentive for inventors to 
invest time and money into developing technological and artistic creations.15 
The patent and copyright systems provide a means for these creators to derive 
 
 10 Id.  
 11 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88; see also MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 
3, at pt. 2, para. 89. 
 12 The Code defines “intellectual property” to include trade secrets, patents, patent applications, plant 
varieties, and copyrights, but not trademarks. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). As used in this Comment, the term 
“intellectual property” refers to those categories of intellectual property included in § 101(35A). 
 13 As discussed further infra in Part I.A, an executory contract is a contract where the obligation of both 
parties are incomplete such that the failure by one party to complete performance would excuse performance 
by the other. See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 
(1973). 
 14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 15 Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 741 (2007). 
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profits from their beneficial activities by granting limited monopoly rights to 
inventors. The ability to license intellectual property is an essential component 
of patent and copyright holders’ ability to make money from their creations 
because it allows third parties to use the inventors’ works while providing 
inventors with compensation for use of their ideas.16 The opportunity for these 
profits through licensing provides inventors with greater financial incentives to 
pursue innovation.17 
Additionally, licensing puts those creative works in the hands of parties 
who are often able to further develop and improve the inventions in ways the 
inventors may not have anticipated.18 Therefore, licensing is vital to advancing 
science and the arts because it provides critical opportunities for inventors to 
make money from their works and promotes an ideal environment for the 
refinement of intellectual property.19 To secure and promote a robust licensing 
market, Congress chose to protect the basic elements of an intellectual property 
license, even in the licensor’s bankruptcy.20 However, with the increased 
prominence of international commerce, chapter 15 of the Code introduces 
potentially devastating uncertainty and instability into U.S. licensing markets 
when a foreign corporate licensor goes bankrupt. 
This Comment argues that, despite the strong mandate for comity and 
cooperation provided by both the Model Law and chapter 15, United States 
courts should deny recognition of a foreign proceeding when foreign law 
allows the debtor to unilaterally cancel all license rights. Part I provides a 
background for both § 365(n) and for chapter 15. Part I.A demonstrates how 
bankruptcy policy has developed to protect intellectual property licenses. The 
Code is a powerful tool with the authority to supersede other laws.21 The Code, 
however, operates within the fundamental policies of the United States, and 
Congress has shaped bankruptcy law to correspond with these policies.22 In the 
context of this Comment, United States bankruptcy law protects the rights of 
 
 16 Id.  
 17 See id. at 737.  
 18 Id. at 741.  
 19 See id. at 737, 741.  
 20 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)–(2) (2006) (providing that even if the trustee rejects the license, the licensee can 
still use the licensed property but must continue to make royalty payments). 
 21 See, e.g., id. § 547 (giving the trustee the power to avoid valid and legal transfers). 
 22 Despite bankruptcy’s broad power, certain laws remain untouched. See, e.g., id. § 365(n) (protecting 
intellectual property licenses from the trustee’s power to reject executory contracts); see also id. § 523(a) 
(exempting, among others, domestic support obligations, educational loans, and intentional tort awards from 
discharge). 
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intellectual property licensees when the licensor goes into bankruptcy. This 
demonstrates that, although much of bankruptcy law is aimed at undoing other 
laws, contracts, and transfers, United States policy is that intellectual property 
licenses are crucial enough to warrant protection, even in bankruptcy. Part I.B 
provides an introduction to cross-border bankruptcy laws, specifically the 
Model Law and how it has been incorporated into United States law as chapter 
15. Part II then analyzes how courts have interpreted both the principle of 
international comity under § 304, the predecessor to chapter 15, and the more 
specific public policy exception in § 1506. Next, Part III analyzes what types 
of policies are sufficiently important that courts should invoke § 1506 when a 
foreign proceeding threatens them. Within the analysis of Part III, this 
Comment will demonstrate what it means for a policy to be “fundamental.” 
The final section of this Comment, Part IV, suggests several solutions to 
extend the protection of intellectual property licenses into international 
bankruptcy cases. First, courts should recognize that securing intellectual 
property licenses is a fundamental policy of the United States and should 
invoke § 1506 when a foreign proceeding threatens them. Secondly, Congress 
should amend § 1520, which governs the effects of recognizing a foreign 
proceeding as a main proceeding. By amending § 1520(a) to include § 365(n), 
licenses will automatically be protected if United States courts grant 
recognition to the foreign proceeding. Finally, as a private matter, licensees 
should include a choice of law clause in their license contracts. Even if neither 
the courts nor the legislature moves to protect this fundamental policy, 
licensees can still ensure their continued use of the intellectual property if their 
licensor files for bankruptcy by contractually agreeing that U.S. law will 
govern the license in bankruptcy. 
While the United States has been able to protect the growth of intellectual 
property within its own borders, especially in the context of the Code, the 
increasingly global economy has left these protections ineffective in 
international insolvency cases. Current law leaves intellectual property licenses 
vulnerable to foreign laws that allow debtors to unilaterally and completely 
cancel the license, contrary to United States law. This severely threatens the 
continuing growth of intellectual property in the United States. This Comment 
suggests that § 1506 allows courts to deny comity where needed to protect 
intellectual property licenses. Doing so will ensure the security of such licenses 
in a chapter 15 case, thereby promoting a robust licensing market and 
ultimately encouraging continued investment in the development of intellectual 
property in the United States. 
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I. BACKGROUND TO § 365(N) AND CHAPTER 15 
Before it is possible to analyze why § 1506 can and should be used to 
protect intellectual property licenses in a chapter 15 case, it is necessary to 
understand why both § 365(n) and chapter 15 were enacted. Part A 
demonstrates that § 365(n) is Congress’s response to the vulnerability of 
intellectual property licenses under § 365. Section 365(n) reflects that the Code 
functions within the broader context of the fundamental policies of the United 
States; one result is the protection of the rights under an intellectual property 
license, regardless of the licensor’s financial condition. Part B then shows that 
Congress enacted chapter 15 to provide a clear framework for cooperation with 
foreign insolvency proceedings. Because it operates as a part of U.S. 
bankruptcy policy, chapter 15 contains a limited grant of discretion, § 1506, 
that courts may invoke when a foreign bankruptcy law or proceeding functions 
in a way that is manifestly contrary to public policy. Section 1506 therefore 
acts as a release valve that facilitates cooperation with the foreign proceeding 
in a way that respects the fundamental policies of the United States.23 
A. Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. and Congress’ Response in § 365(n) 
Section 365(n) demonstrates the importance of maintaining the security of 
intellectual property licenses. Even though bankruptcy law has the ability to 
unwind other laws, Congress has explicitly provided that bankruptcy law 
cannot entirely unwind an intellectual property license. In choosing to protect 
such licenses regardless of the licensor’s bankruptcy, Congress demonstrated 
that sustaining the stability of intellectual property licenses is more important 
than allowing the debtor to entirely reject a license. This section will explore 
the background of § 365(n) and the policies it reflects. 
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.)24 threatened the stability of intellectual 
property licensing and the continued development of intellectual property in 
the United States.25 In July 1982, Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (RMF) 
entered into a nonexclusive license with Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. (Lubrizol) 
to allow Lubrizol to use metal processing technology owned by RMF.26 RMF’s 
 
 23 See id. § 1506. 
 24 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 
F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).  
 25 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2–3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–03. 
 26 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045. The license required RMF to notify Lubrizol 
of any patent infringement lawsuits against RMF or of any other licensing of the technology, to reduce the 
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business declined, and it filed for bankruptcy in August 1983.27 As part of its 
reorganization plan, RMF rejected the license with Lubrizol under § 365(a), 
thus allowing RMF to sell or further license the technology, unburdened by the 
Lubrizol license.28 
As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court concluded that the license was 
executory because nonperformance by either party would constitute a material 
breach.29 The contract was executory with respect to RMF because, among 
other reasons, RMF continued to owe a duty to inform Lubrizol of any 
licensing and other uses of the technology and to reduce Lubrizol’s royalties if 
another license is issued at a lower price.30 Further, the contract was executory 
with respect to Lubrizol because Lubrizol owed RMF the continuing duty to 
account for and pay royalties, including delivering quarterly sales reports and 
having a certified public accountant inspect Lubrizol’s financial documents.31 
The court then turned to the question of whether the rejection would be 
beneficial to RMF and held that RMF’s decision to reject the license was not 
unreasonable under the business judgment rule.32 The bankruptcy court thus 
approved the rejection of the Lubrizol license.33 
On appeal, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia reversed 
the bankruptcy court, holding that the rejection was not a sound business 
decision.34 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, 
holding the district court failed to apply the business judgment rule and instead 
 
royalty payments if RMF contracts at a lower rate with another party, and to indemnify Lubrizol against any 
breach of warranty or misrepresentation by RMF. In return, Lubrizol paid royalties to RMF. Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. Section 365(a) allows a debtor to reject or assume contracts when: (1) the contract is executory and 
(2) the court approves the rejection or assumption as beneficial to the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a); see also 
In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045. 
 29 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045–46. The court used Professor Vern 
Countryman’s widely accepted analysis defining executory contracts as those in which the “obligation of both 
the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete 
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other.” Countryman, supra 
note 13, at 460, quoted in In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045. 
 30 In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045. 
 31 Id. at 1046. The mere obligation to pay another party does not make a contract executory. Because 
Lubrizol was required to account for the royalties by providing sales reports and keeping records subject to 
inspection, Lubrizol’s continuing obligations made the contract executory. Id. 
 32 Id. at 1046–47. The business judgment rule prevents courts from attempting to retroactively determine 
the appropriateness of a business decision. The rule is that courts should defer to decisions of a business except 
upon a finding of bad faith or a gross abuse of “business discretion.” Id. 
 33 Id. at 1047. 
 34 Id. 
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substituted its own business judgment.35 Lubrizol argued that the district 
court’s refusal both to follow the business judgment rule and to treat the 
contract as executory was the correct result on policy grounds.36 The court of 
appeals recognized Lubrizol’s concerns but nonetheless reversed the district 
court’s ruling, stating: “It cannot be gainsaid that allowing rejection of such 
contracts as executory imposes serious burdens upon contracting  
parties . . . . Nor can it be doubted that allowing rejection in this and 
comparable cases could have a general chilling effect upon the willingness of 
such parties to contract at all . . . .”37 Since Congress had clearly provided a 
mechanism for rejecting such contracts under § 365(a)38 and had not provided 
a special provision for technology licenses, the Fourth Circuit concluded that 
Lubrizol’s policy arguments were insufficient to prevail where RMF’s actions 
were clearly authorized by the Code.39 
Lubrizol demonstrated the judicial trend of allowing debtors to use § 365 to 
terminate a licensee’s right to use the licensed property.40 Congress took the 
result in Lubrizol very seriously and passed the Intellectual Property 
Bankruptcy Protection Act (IPBPA) in 1988.41 IPBPA amended § 365 to 
include § 365(n), which specifically ensures that licensees’ right to use the 
licensed property “cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result of the rejection of 
the license pursuant to [§] 365.”42 The Senate Report accompanying the 
IPBPA demonstrates that Congress understood this potential rejection of 
licenses to threaten the fundamental policy of advancing the growth of science 
and technology.43 Congress enacted the IPBPA to defeat the “threat to the 
development of American Technology” created by cases such as Lubrizol.44 
Congress recognized that instability in the licensing market would have a 
substantial negative impact on the advancement of technology and drafted 
§ 365(n) to afford licensees both certainty and protection.45 The overall effect 
of § 365(n) is that a trustee may still reject an executory license if doing so 
 
 35 Id. at 1047–48. 
 36 Id. at 1048. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201. 
 41 Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988) (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, 365(n) (2006)). 
 42 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1. 
 43 Id. at 2–3. 
 44 Id. at 1. 
 45 Id. at 3. 
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would be beneficial to the estate, but § 365(n) allows “IP licensees to retain 
their rights under [the] rejected license agreements.”46 The Senate Report 
explicitly indicates that Congress recognized the gravity of the potential impact 
of Lubrizol-type cases: “It is not an overstatement to say that the change is a 
fundamental threat to the creative process that has nurtured innovation in the 
United States.”47 Without some statutory protection, the impact of these cases 
would continue to hinder the development of technology and the financial 
incentives for creators and inventors to continue to create and invent.48 
Congress thus enacted § 365(n) to protect the stability and flexibility of the 
American licensing market and to preserve the economic viability of licensing 
intellectual property.49 
A trustee’s rejection of an executory contract where the debtor is a licensor 
of intellectual property triggers the application of § 365(n).50 Section 365(n)(1) 
allows the licensee to either treat the rejection as a breach, which would have 
been available without the IPBPA, or to retain its rights under the license.51 If 
the licensee chooses to retain its rights, § 365(n)(2) requires the trustee to 
permit the licensee to use the intellectual property as provided in the license.52 
Section 365(n)(2) also requires the licensee to continue making all royalty 
payments as required by the license.53 However, § 365(n) does not allow the 
licensee to seek specific performance or any other affirmative performance 
from the debtor or the trustee.54 Essentially, § 365(n) allows the licensee to 
assert its right to use the intellectual property and make payments, while 
releasing the debtor or trustee from all active obligations.55 Section 365(n) only 
applies once the trustee rejects the contract, but § 365(n)(4) allows the licensee 
to force the trustee’s hand by requesting the trustee not interfere with the 
licensee’s contract rights and to either perform the contract or provide the 
intellectual property to the licensee.56 In sum, Congress drafted § 365(n) to 
 
 46 Menell, supra note 15, at 772. 
 47 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 48 Id. at 3. The impact of Lubrizol-type cases on the licensing market is further discussed infra in Part III. 
 49 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3. 
 50 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006).  
 51 Id. § 365(n)(1); see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5–6. 
 52 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2); see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 6. 
 53 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2); see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 7–8. 
 54 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 6, 8. Section 365(n)(3) only requires the trustee to provide any intellectual 
property, as specified by the license, and not interfere with the rights of the licensee under the contract. 11 
U.S.C. § 365(n)(3). 
 55 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 6. 
 56 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(4). 
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“satisfy the needs of intellectual property licensees to continue their 
exploitation of intellectual property while shielding debtor-licensors from any 
additional burdens associated with the license.”57 In doing so, Congress chose 
to pursue the goal of promoting the growth of science and technology by 
protecting an intellectual property license’s essential elements, even in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
B. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency and Chapter 15 
In 1997, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) adopted the Model Law to provide examples of efficient 
methods for dealing with cross-border insolvency cases.58 Prior to the Model 
Law, most national insolvency laws were unable to appropriately handle the 
increased number of international bankruptcies.59 Further, the Model Law’s 
Guide to Enactment (Guide) notes that this lack of “predictability in the 
handling of cross-border insolvency cases impedes capital flow and is a 
disincentive to cross-border investment.”60 The purpose of the Model Law was 
to “assist States to equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized[,] 
and fair framework to address more effectively instances of cross-border 
insolvency.”61 More specifically, the Model Law was adopted to foster legal 
certainty within international trade, maximize the value of a debtor’s assets, 
and to protect the interests of creditors and all other interested parties.62 
The Model Law is intended to fit into an enacting State’s existing 
insolvency law and provide a procedural guide for handling cross-border 
insolvency cases.63 As with most model laws, the Guide allows states to make 
changes to the Model Law to better incorporate it into their existing laws.64 
While this flexibility in enactment is helpful when a State chooses to adopt the 
Model Law, the Guide recommends that modifications be kept to a 
minimum.65 By creating a fairly uniform system, the Model Law seeks to 
 
 57 Menell, supra note 15, at 772. 
 58 G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998); see also MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER 
INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 1, pmbl. 
 59 MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 2, para. 13.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at pt. 2, para. 1. 
 62 Id. at pt. 1, pmbl. 
 63 Id. at pt. 2, para. 20. 
 64 Id. at pt. 2, para. 12. 
 65 Id. The Model Law loses its primary purpose—to provide a relatively uniform system of cross-border 
insolvency proceedings—if an enacting State makes too many changes to the model law. Id. 
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foster procedural clarity and cooperation between judges and courts from 
different countries.66 This cooperation has its limits, though, and the Model 
Law includes Article 6, a public policy exception that grants a court some 
discretion in providing relief or recognizing a foreign proceeding.67 Because 
the Model Law was intended to create consistency and predictability in 
international bankruptcies, legislatures and courts must interpret this exception 
narrowly to avoid drastically varying applications from country to country.68 
Article 6 reads: “Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to 
take an action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary 
to the public policy of this State.”69 The Guide explains that this article should 
be limited to only those policies that reflect “fundamental principles of law,” 
and courts should only use this exception when the application of foreign law 
would contravene those principles.70 The Guide also distinguishes between 
public policy in the domestic context and its application to international 
affairs.71 To promote international cooperation, which is the central purpose of 
the Model Law, public policy should be construed more strictly in the context 
of international matters and in recognition of foreign law.72 Accordingly, 
UNCITRAL used the word “manifestly” when drafting the Model Law to 
emphasize that the public policy exception should be construed narrowly and 
should only be invoked in cases involving “matters of fundamental importance 
for the enacting State.”73 
As of February 2011, nineteen countries had adopted the Model Law and 
incorporated it into their respective national insolvency codes, with the United 
States joining in 2005.74 As part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the United States adopted chapter 15 of 
 
 66 Id. at pt. 1, pmbl., pt. 2, para. 38. 
 67 Id. at pt. 1, ch. 1, art. 6.  
 68 See, e.g., id. at pt. 2, paras. 1, 13. 
 69 Id. at pt. 1, ch. 1, art. 6.  
 70 See id. at pt. 2, paras. 87–88. 
 71 Id. at pt. 2, para. 88. 
 72 Id. at pt. 2, para. 88. 
 73 Id. at pt. 2, para. 89. 
 74 Status: 1997—UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011). Prior to the adoption of the Model Law in the United States, § 304 governed how courts cooperated 
with foreign proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 146 (2005). Specifically, § 304(c) 
provided six factors to weigh when deciding whether the United States courts should grant recognition to a 
foreign proceeding. Id. § 304(c). The most important factor for this Comment is comity. See id. § 304(c)(5).  
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the Code, which tracked the language of the Model Law with minimal 
changes.75 Chapter 15 provides, among other things, guidance in dealing with 
foreign representatives or courts that seek assistance in the United States 
regarding a foreign proceeding; chapter 15 further provides a framework for 
courts to analyze whether they should recognize a foreign representative and a 
foreign proceeding.76 
The purpose of chapter 15 is to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing 
with cases of cross-border insolvency,”77 which it does by establishing clear 
procedures for starting a case ancillary to a “foreign proceeding.”78 Chapter 15 
is appropriate where a “foreign representative”79 seeks cooperation from the 
United States court in connection with a foreign proceeding or where cases in 
the United States and a foreign country concerning the same debtor are 
pending at the same time.80 A foreign representative begins a chapter 15 
ancillary case by filing a petition for recognition under § 1515.81 The United 
States court can recognize the foreign proceeding as either a “foreign main 
proceeding”82 or as a “foreign nonmain proceeding.”83 Chapter 15 grants the 
United States courts fairly wide discretion in cooperating with the foreign court 
to craft appropriate relief.84 There is a strong emphasis on cooperation with the 
foreign court throughout chapter 15, most notably in § 1525, which explicitly 
directs the United States court to communicate directly with the foreign 
court.85 However, neither chapter 15 nor the Model Law requires absolute 
 
 75 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501; see also 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1501.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. 
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011). 
 76 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501(b)(1), 1515. 
 77 Id. § 1501(a). 
 78 A “foreign proceeding” is a “collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign  
country . . . under a law relating to insolvency or adjustment of debt in which proceeding the assets and affairs 
of the debtor are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or 
liquidation.” Id. § 101(23). 
 79 A “foreign representative” is “a person or body, including a person or body appointed on an interim 
basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s 
assets or affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.” Id. § 101(24). 
 80 Id. § 1501(b). 
 81 Id. § 1504. 
 82 A “foreign main proceeding” is “a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has the 
center of its main interest.” Id. § 1502(4). 
 83 A “foreign nonmain proceeding” is “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, 
pending in a country where the debtor has an establishment.” Id. § 1502(5). 
 84 See, e.g., id. §§ 1520–1522. For example, § 1521 allows the court to grant “any appropriate relief” to 
further “effectuate the purpose[s] of this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the 
creditors.” Id. § 1521(a). 
 85 Id. § 1525; see also id. §§ 1526–1527. 
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cooperation, and both contain a limited grant of discretion to the court in 
determining whether to recognize a foreign proceeding.86 
Chapter 15 includes § 1506, a public policy exception that copies the 
Model Law’s Article 6 language almost word for word.87 The House Report 
accompanying chapter 15 explicitly states that courts should use the Guide to 
interpret the provisions of chapter 15.88 With respect to § 1506, the House 
Report notes that this provision has been interpreted narrowly around the world 
and that the word “manifestly” restricts this exception to the “most 
fundamental policies of the United States.”89 Again, it is important to note that 
one of the central purposes of the Model Law and chapter 15 is to foster 
greater legal certainty and cooperation in the context of cross-border 
insolvency cases.90 The reason that the Model Law, and thereby § 1506, 
restrict this exception to fundamental public policy is that “international 
cooperation would be unduly hampered if public policy would be understood 
in an extensive manner.”91 
Section 1506 is unique because no other chapter in the Code requires a 
provision to protect the policies of the United States. The Code and bankruptcy 
policy generally are necessarily shaped by the fundamental policies of the 
United States. However, chapter 15 requires United States courts to cooperate 
with foreign courts, controlled by foreign laws92 which may not respect the 
fundamental policies of the United States.93 The goal of chapter 15, and the 
Code more broadly, is the efficient and cooperative administration of the 
bankruptcy case;94 § 1506 favors this goal by allowing the United States court 
to cooperate with the foreign proceeding in a way that guarantees that the 
fundamental policies of the United States are respected. 
 
 86 Id. § 1506; MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 1, ch. 1, art. 6. 
 87 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (“Nothing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed 
by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United States.”). 
 88 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172–73. 
 89 Id. 
 90 MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 1, pmbl. 
 91 Id. at pt. 2, para. 88. 
 92 See 8 COLLIER, supra note 75, ¶ 1501.01 (“Chapter 15 cases are generally intended to be 
supplementary to cases brought in the debtor’s home country.”). 
 93 See, e.g., In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the German law allowing 
surveillance of debtor’s emails without the debtor’s consent or without a court order would violate American 
criminal law and the debtor’s constitutional and statutory privacy rights). 
 94 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a) (2006). 
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II. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COMITY AND THE § 1506 PUBLIC 
POLICY EXCEPTION 
This Comment will now explore both § 304, the precursor to chapter 15, 
and the § 1506 exception. First, this section will analyze the cases that 
considered § 304(c), which codified the principle of comity, and discuss the 
circumstances under which comity should be denied. This section will then 
show that United States courts have interpreted § 1506 narrowly. These cases 
taken together demonstrate that, consistent with the purposes of the Model 
Law and chapter 15, United States courts should only refuse to cooperate with 
a foreign proceeding to protect a fundamental policy of the United States. 
A. Section 304(c) and the Principle of Comity 
Congress adopted § 304 as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.95 
Section 304(c) enumerated certain factors for courts to use when determining 
whether to grant relief to a foreign representative.96 In pursuing “an 
economical and expeditious administration” of an international bankruptcy 
case, the court would consider the just treatment of all claim holders, the 
protection of United States creditors, and the principle of comity, to name a 
few factors.97 Section 304(c)(5) codified the common law doctrine of comity, 
whose best known definition comes from the 1895 Supreme Court case, Hilton 
v. Guyot.98 
According to Hilton, comity “is the recognition which one nation allows 
within its territory to the . . . acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens.”99 The 
Hilton Court held that comity dictates that United States courts should usually 
grant recognition where the foreign proceeding afforded “a full and fair trial 
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction.”100 However, the Court also 
held that comity should not operate such that any “nation will suffer the laws 
 
 95 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000), repealed by Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 802(d)(3), 119 Stat. 23, 146 (2005); see also Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer 
Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 454 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 96 11 U.S.C. § 304(c). 
 97 Id. The other factors are the prevention of preferential or fraudulent transfers, the fair distribution of 
proceeds of the estate to each creditor, and the provision of a fresh start, where appropriate. Id. 
 98 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 99 Id. at 164. 
 100 Id. at 202. 
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of another to interfere with her own to the injury of her citizens.”101 As courts 
have continued to analyze the principle of comity, this tension between 
respecting fair foreign proceedings and the protection of United States citizens 
from foreign laws has continued to shape their analyses. 
More recently, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided a pair of cases 
involving related bankrupt Swedish corporations; both opinions discussed this 
principle of comity. The first case was Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer 
Services AB, where the court found that protecting the forum state’s public 
policy interests and the rights of its residents should guide the comity 
analysis.102 Salen filed for bankruptcy in Stockholm, and the Swedish court 
appointed an interim administrator.103 Despite this pending action, Cunard 
commenced an action in the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York and obtained an order of attachment against Salen’s assets in the United 
States.104 Salen moved to vacate the attachment, arguing the United States 
should grant comity to the Swedish court’s stay on all creditor actions, 
including Cunard.105 
As a threshold to the comity analysis, the court found that the Swedish 
court had valid jurisdiction over Cunard.106 The guiding principle in a comity 
analysis under § 304(c) is the just treatment of all creditors and security 
holders, and comity should be granted if the public policy of the forum state 
and the rights of its residents would not be violated.107 Citing a Third Circuit 
opinion, the court determined “[c]omity should be withheld only when its 
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called 
upon to give it effect.”108 The court held that granting comity to the Swedish 
proceeding would not violate United States public policy; furthermore, 
granting recognition would also give effect to the purpose of the automatic stay 
when the debtor files.109 In so holding, the court affirmed the decision to vacate 
Cunard’s attachment.110 
 
 101 Id. at 164. 
 102 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 103 Id. at 454. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 457–59. 
 107 Id. at 457. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 457–60.  
 110 Id. at 461. 
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Two years later, the Second Circuit decided Victrix Steamship Co., S.A. v. 
Salen Dry Cargo A.B., a case with facts very similar to those in Cunard.111 
After Salen declared bankruptcy in the Swedish court, Victrix pursued 
arbitration in London to recover damages for Salen’s breach of their contract, 
while also pursuing an admiralty claim in the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York.112 After the London arbitrator held in favor of Victrix, 
Victrix moved the district court to attach Salen’s property in the United States 
and to recognize the London arbitration award.113 In response, Salen moved to 
vacate the attachment, which the district court granted.114 Salen argued the 
United States court should grant comity to the Swedish bankruptcy action, 
while Victrix argued the United States court should grant comity to both the 
London arbitration award and the British court judgment.115 Again, the court 
found that comity should be extended where recognition of the foreign 
proceeding “does not prejudice the rights of United States citizens or violate 
domestic public policy.”116 In weighing the two arguments, the court held that 
pursuing an economical and expeditious administration of the bankruptcy case, 
as dictated by § 304, compelled the court to grant comity to the Swedish 
proceeding and deny comity to the London arbitration.117 In so holding, the 
court was protecting the United States’ “public policy of ensuring equitable 
and orderly distribution of local assets of a foreign bankrupt.”118 
Further, in In re Hourani, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that a United States court should only grant comity to a foreign 
proceeding when that proceeding is in accord with United States’ general 
principles of justice.119 The case began when the Central Bank of Jordan 
declared Petra Bank of Amman (Petra), a Jordanian bank, insolvent and forced 
Petra into liquidation proceedings.120 Seven months before Petra went into 
liquidation proceedings, A.I. Trade (A.I.), an international financing firm, 
 
 111 Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 112 Id. at 711. At the same time Victrix was pursuing the arbitration in London, Victrix also brought cases 
in both the District Court for the Southern District of New York as an admiralty action and in New York 
Supreme Court for breach of contract. Salen then removed the state case to federal court, and both cases were 
then combined. Id. 
 113 Id. at 710–12. 
 114 Id. at 712. 
 115 Id. at 714 (“Victrix contends that comity itself provides justification for enforcing the London award 
and the British judgment.”). 
 116 Id. at 713. 
 117 Id. at 714. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 69–70 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 120 Id. at 61. 
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commenced an action in the district court when Petra refused to pay certain 
promissory notes A.I. held.121 The liquidation committee moved the 
bankruptcy court to grant summary judgment in its favor and to defer to the 
Jordanian insolvency proceeding.122 In deciding whether to defer to the 
Jordanian proceeding, the court first noted that deference should be granted 
only if the Jordanian proceeding would be fair and impartial.123 The court then 
held that comity should only be granted where the foreign proceedings are in 
accord with American notions of justice.124 In other words, “[t]he key is that 
the insolvency laws in the foreign proceeding must not be repugnant to this 
nation’s general principles of justice, regardless of the form in which those 
principles are manifested.”125 Because the Jordanian proceeding failed to 
protect due process or to “ensure fair and equal treatment of all creditors,” the 
United States court did not defer to that proceeding and denied the liquidation 
committee’s motion for summary judgment.126 
The next year, in Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re 
Maxwell Communication Corp.), the Second Circuit found that the comity 
analysis is only triggered when there is a genuine conflict between foreign and 
domestic law.127 Maxwell Communication Corporation (Maxwell) was a 
public holding company headquartered in England; however, 80% of its assets 
were located in the United States.128 When Maxwell went into bankruptcy, it 
filed both a chapter 11 petition in the United States and a petition for an 
administration order in Great Britain.129 Within ninety days of filing for 
chapter 11 relief, Maxwell made several transfers to three banks and sought to 
recover those transfers in the United States case.130 The issue before the court 
 
 121 Id. at 60–61. A.I. was able to successfully obtain an attachment of approximately $4 million of Petra’s 
funds that were being held in the United States. Id. at 61. 
 122 Id. at 60. Petra also moved the court to vacate the attachment. Id. 
 123 Id. at 64. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 65. 
 126 Id. at 70. For example, the Jordanian proceeding did not provide open access to information regarding 
Petra, did not require reasonably adequate notice, and had no method for preventing or undoing fraudulent 
transfers of preferences. Id. at 67–68. 
 127 Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 
(2d Cir. 1996). 
 128 Id. at 1040. 
 129 Id. at 1041. An administration is the closest British law to chapter 11 in the United States. The British 
petition was filed the day after the U.S. petition. Id. 
 130 Id. at 1040. About seven months after Maxwell’s filing, one of the banks obtained an order from the 
British court barring Maxwell from commencing a suit to recover the amount. The British court later vacated 
the order, and deferred to the U.S. court as to whether U.S. or British avoidance law would apply to Maxwell’s 
suit. Id. at 1042–43. 
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was whether American or British avoidance law should apply; this was an 
important distinction because transfers are only voidable under British law 
when the debtor intended to put the transferee in a better position.131 The court 
began its analysis by noting the doctrine of comity is only relevant when there 
is a “true conflict between American law and that of a foreign jurisdiction.”132 
Such a true conflict exists, as in this case, where it is impossible to comply 
with the laws of both jurisdictions.133 The court went on to hold that because 
Maxwell was a British corporation with mostly British creditors, the British 
court had a greater interest in the litigation and, therefore, British law should 
control.134 
Recently, the Fourth Circuit decided French v. Liebmann (In re French) 
and held that ease of administration of a bankruptcy case is an important 
consideration for a comity analysis.135 The case involved a fraudulent transfer 
of property in the Bahamas where the debtor deeded her Bahamian property to 
her children in 1981.136 To avoid Bahamian transfer taxes, however, the 
recipients did not record the deed until the year 2000 when the debtor was on 
the verge of bankruptcy.137 After the debtor filed for bankruptcy, the trustee 
commenced an adversary proceeding to recover the transfer.138 The transferees 
argued that “considerations of international comity counseled the application 
of Bahamian (rather than United States) bankruptcy law.”139 The court 
recognized that granting comity involves recognizing that the application of 
foreign law is more appropriate than the application of U.S. law.140 The court 
also found that the Supreme Court looks to the factors stated in the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations to decide whether comity controls.141 
 
 131 Id. at 1043. 
 132 Id. at 1049. 
 133 Id. at 1050 (“[W]hat was required to establish a true conflict was an allegation that compliance with 
the regulatory laws of both countries would be impossible.” (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 
U.S. 764, 799 (1993))); see also Argo Fund Ltd. v. Bd. of Dirs. of Telecom Arg., S.A. (In re Bd. of Dirs. of 
Telecom Arg., S.A.), 528 F.3d 162, 173 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Comity, however, does not require that foreign 
proceedings afford a creditor identical protections as under U.S. bankruptcy law.”). 
 134 In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d at 1051–52. 
 135 See French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 154 (4th Cir. 2006); see also id. at 155 
(Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“Ease and centrality of administration are thus foundational characteristics of 
bankruptcy law.”). 
 136 Id. at 148. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 149. Bahamian law would have allowed them to keep the deed to the property. Id. 
 140 Id. at 153. 
 141 Id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 818–19 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Those factors are: “the extent to which the activity takes place within the 
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Ultimately, the court held that because much of the activity being litigated—
the transfer of the deed—occurred in the United States and because the 
property was part of a larger estate located in the United States, comity should 
be denied and United States law should apply.142 Judge Wilkinson, in his 
concurring opinion, further noted that “[e]ase and centrality of administration 
are . . . foundational characteristics of bankruptcy law,” and should be 
considered when determining whether a foreign country’s law is the 
appropriate law to apply.143 
In sum, the doctrine of comity, formerly codified at § 304(c)(5), strongly 
encourages United States courts to cooperate with foreign courts. As a 
threshold, the court need not analyze whether to recognize foreign law or a 
foreign proceeding when there is no genuine conflict between the law or 
proceeding and United States law.144 When there is such a conflict, the court 
should only grant comity when the foreign proceeding provides a fair and 
complete trial and otherwise comports with American notions of due 
process.145 Even if the foreign proceeding provides for due process, comity 
should be denied under § 304(c)(5) if granting recognition would violate the 
rights of American citizens or the public policy of the Unites States.146 Finally, 
comity should be granted where the foreign proceedings are in accord with 
U.S. notions of justice.147 Again, while § 304 has been repealed by the 
adoption of chapter 15, this idea of comity is important because chapter 15, 
and specifically § 1506, were meant to work within existing U.S. case law.148 
Therefore, § 1506 does not present a new standard but rather refines and, as the 
following section will show, substantially narrows the concept of comity. 
 
territory,” “the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state 
and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,” “the extent to which other states 
regulate such activities,” “the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic 
system,” “the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system,” “the 
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity,” and “the likelihood of conflict 
with regulation by another state.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2) (1987). 
 142 In re French, 440 F.3d at 154. 
 143 Id. at 155 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). 
 144 Maxwell Commc’n Corp. v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 
(2d Cir. 1996). The principle of comity is used to determine whether it is appropriate to recognize the foreign 
law when there is such a conflict. Id. 
 145 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895). 
 146 Victrix S.S. Co., S.A. v. Salen Dry Cargo A.B., 825 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1987); Cunard S.S. Co. v. 
Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 147 In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 65 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 148 See MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 2, para. 20.  
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B. The Public Policy Exception of § 1506 
Since Congress adopted chapter 15, there have been very few cases that 
have dealt with § 1506, and these cases have narrowly construed the public 
policy exception.149 In fact, only two cases have invoked § 1506 to deny 
recognition of a foreign proceeding.150 Despite the limited case law, these 
cases demonstrate how the courts have interpreted § 1506 thus far. Because the 
Model Law and chapter 15 were intended to augment, but not replace, existing 
bankruptcy laws,151 the interpretations of the former § 304(c)(5) help provide a 
context for how §1506 should be construed. While the grounds for which 
recognition should be denied were relatively broad under § 304(c), § 1506 is a 
much more limited exception.152 Section 1506 narrows the scope of § 304(c) 
and instructs United States courts to grant recognition of foreign proceedings 
or law unless they violate fundamental policies of the United States.153 The 
cases that follow present the framework that has been established for analyzing 
whether a § 1506 exception is appropriate; the courts that have considered 
§ 1506 have followed the warrant in the legislative history154 and restricted 
§ 1506 to only fundamental policies of the United States. However, even 
following this narrow framework, courts should invoke § 1506 where foreign 
law threatens the rights of an intellectual property licensee. 
One of the first § 1506 cases, Iida v. Kitahara (In re Iida), held that a 
litigant must show a fundamental policy of the United States is threatened by a 
foreign proceeding before the court may use § 1506 to deny recognition of that 
proceeding.155 After the Japanese debtor, Iida, filed for bankruptcy in Japan, a 
trustee was appointed pursuant to Japanese bankruptcy law.156 The debtor was 
 
 149 See, e.g., Scott C. Mund, Comment, 11 U.S.C. 1506: U.S. Courts Keep a Tight Rein on the Public 
Policy Exception, but the Potential to Undermine International Cooperation in Insolvency Proceedings 
Remains, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 340 (2010). 
 150 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 196–201 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 
372–73 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 151 MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 2, para. 20; see also ELIZABETH 
WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT, CASES, AND 
PROBLEMS 854 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that chapter 15 “was not intended to change greatly United States law as 
it had developed under [§] 304”). 
 152 See 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172. 
 153 11 U.S.C. § 1506; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88. 
 154 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (noting that including “manifestly” restricts § 1506 to fundamental 
policies). 
 155 See Iida v. Kitahara (In re Iida), 377 B.R. 243, 259 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
 156 Id. at 247. 
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the owner, an officer and director of three Hawaiian corporations.157 Pursuant 
to his power under Japanese insolvency law, the trustee removed the debtor as 
officer and director of the three Hawaiian corporations and sought to sell some 
of the companies’ real property.158 
More than a year later, the debtor filed a complaint in Hawaiian court 
seeking to undo the trustee’s actions.159 The trustee filed a chapter 15 petition 
for recognition of the Japanese bankruptcy case as a foreign main proceeding 
and commenced an ancillary proceeding.160 The debtor objected to the trustee’s 
petition and relied on § 1506 to argue that granting the petition and recognizing 
the trustee’s actions after the fact would be manifestly contrary to public 
policy.161 The debtor claimed that the trustee was required to seek permission 
from the United States court before removing the debtor from the Hawaiian 
corporations.162 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Hawaii dismissed the debtor’s 
§ 1506 claim, and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit (BAP) 
affirmed, finding the debtor failed to state a fundamental policy of the United 
States that would conflict with recognition of the Japanese proceeding.163 In 
fact, the Japanese court was exercising jurisdiction over the debtor’s property 
as part of the debtor’s estate, regardless of where it was located; this coincides 
with a fundamental United States bankruptcy policy that the debtor’s estate 
includes all of the debtor’s “property, wherever located and by whomever 
held.”164 The bankruptcy court held, and the BAP again affirmed, that as soon 
as the Japanese court appointed the trustee, all of the debtor’s rights and 
interests vested in that trustee.165 In this case, there were no problems with full 
cooperation with the Japanese proceeding because Japanese law corresponded 
with United States bankruptcy policy.166 Therefore, a debtor cannot invoke 
 
 157 Id. at 247–48. 
 158 Id. at 249–50. 
 159 Id. at 250. The Japanese bankruptcy court specifically authorized the trustee to obtain full legal effect 
in the U.S. courts of both Japanese court’s orders and the trustee’s actions. Id. 
 160 Id. at 250–51. 
 161 Id. at 251. Specifically, the debtor argued the trustee was required to obtain recognition and permission 
by the U.S. courts before exercising authority over the debtor’s U.S. corporate assets. Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. at 259. 
 164 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
 165 In re Iida, 377 B.R. at 263. 
 166 Id. 
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§ 1506 without also claiming a fundamental policy of the United States is 
threatened by granting recognition of a foreign proceeding.167 
In 2008, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado decided In re 
Ernst & Young, Inc. and held that a foreign proceeding does not violate a 
fundamental policy of the United States simply because it would produce a 
different result than would a proceeding wholly under U.S. law.168 Efrat and 
Hidai Friedman, Israeli citizens living in Canada, formed a corporation called 
Klytie’s Developments, Inc. (KDI) with Jason Sharkey, a Colorado resident.169 
KDI in turn created Klytie’s Developments, LLC (KD/CO).170 Following 
investigations by both the Colorado Securities Commissioner and the Alberta 
Securities Commissioner (ASC), the ASC froze all of the Friedmans’ and 
KDI’s assets.171 Defrauded U.S. investors (Plaintiffs) filed suit in Colorado 
against KDI, KD/CO, the Friedmans, and Sharkey, alleging fraud and 
violations of Colorado securities law.172 The Court of Queen’s Bench of 
Alberta, District of Calgary (Canadian Court), began a receivership proceeding 
and appointed Ernst & Young, Inc. as receiver for KDI.173 The Canadian Court 
later expanded the order to include the Friedmans and related entities such as 
KD/CO; the expanded order also stayed all legal proceedings involving KDI, 
the Friedmans, or either’s property.174 The receiver then filed a petition for 
recognition of the receivership proceeding under chapter 15 in the bankruptcy 
court.175 
 
 167 See id. at 259. 
 168 See In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008). 
 169 Id. at 774. 
 170 Id. The Friedmans and Sharkey used KDI and KD/CO to obtain investments to finance the purchase of 
real estate around the world, which would act as the assets of an investment fund. Id. at 774–75. The money 
that was raised was deposited in U.S. banks, and a significant amount was transferred to KDI and the 
Friedmans. Id.  
 171 Id. at 775. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. at 775–76. This later order also authorized the receiver to manage the affected businesses and 
explicitly “authorized the [r]eceiver to seek recognition of its orders and to seek ‘aid and recognition’ of courts 
in the United States.” Id. at 776. 
 175 Id. The petition stated that the receivership proceeding, arising under the insolvency laws of Canada, 
was a foreign main proceeding, and that recognition was necessary for the receiver to pursue the assets of KDI, 
the Friedmans, and Sharkey located in the United States. Id. The case was properly under chapter 15 because 
the receivership proceeding arose under insolvency law and sought to collect the assets of the Friedmans, KDI, 
and KD/CO, and distribute those assets to defrauded investors who became involuntary creditors due to the 
fraud. See id. 
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The Plaintiffs objected to recognition of the foreign proceeding on the 
ground that it would be manifestly contrary to public policy and thus violate 
§ 1506.176 The Plaintiffs first argued that United States investors would receive 
less under the Canadian receivership proceeding, which also included 
Canadian and Israeli investors, than they would from the U.S. bankruptcy 
court.177 Additionally, the costs of the receivership proceeding, the Plaintiffs 
further argued, would deplete the assets of KDI and KD/CO to the point that 
distributions to investors would be minimal.178 After first recognizing that 
§ 1506 is a narrow exception, the bankruptcy court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
arguments.179 Specifically, the court held that a plaintiff receiving a smaller 
distribution in a foreign proceeding is not by itself manifestly contrary to 
United States public policy and is thus insufficient to invoke § 1506.180 
Together, In re Ernst & Young, Inc. and In re Iida demonstrate that the 
threshold to invoke § 1506 is very high.181 Courts will not deny recognition 
pursuant to § 1506 in the absence of a threat to a fundamental policy.182 A 
foreign proceeding does not violate a fundamental public policy simply 
because it may produce smaller distributions for each creditor; neither does a 
foreign proceeding violate a fundamental public policy because the proceeding 
would deplete the debtor’s assets more than a United States proceeding.183 
These holdings demonstrate that, because not every American law implements 
a fundamental policy, a foreign law which simply functions differently than a 
domestic law does not necessarily violate a fundamental policy. 
More broadly, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York 
held in In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments that a fundamental 
policy of the United States is not necessarily violated simply because a foreign 
 
 176 Id. at 781. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. First, the court ruled all wronged investors should share in recovery from KDI and KD/CO, not just 
U.S. investors. Id. Second, the court also found no support that the costs of the Canadian proceeding would 
deplete KDI and KD/CO’s assets so drastically as to violate public policy; after all, liquidation costs are to be 
expected, regardless of whether they arise in a foreign proceeding or a U.S. bankruptcy case. Id.  
 181 See Iida v. Kitahara (In re Iida), 377 B.R. 243, 259 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 
383 B.R. at 781. 
 182 See In re Iida, 377 B.R. at 259; In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. at 781 (“[T]his exception is to be 
applied narrowly[] and should be invoked only when the most fundamental policies of the United States are at 
risk.”). 
 183 In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. at 781. 
NOLAN GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 11:21 AM 
200 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
proceeding provides relief that is typically unavailable in American courts.184 
The sub-prime mortgage collapse in the United States severely disrupted the 
Canadian asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market, which froze in 
August 2007.185 Primary actors in the ABCP market sought to limit their 
exposure by restructuring their obligations.186 The largest noteholders and asset 
providers signed an agreement establishing a reorganization plan that provided 
for, among other things, a third-party release187 and an injunction.188 Metcalfe 
& Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corporation and other foreign 
investors (together, Metcalfe) were parties to the Canadian proceedings that 
sought to restructure all outstanding ABCP obligations that were not bank-
sponsored.189 The third-party release would apply to Metcalfe and release 
Metcalfe from liability for any third-party ABCP market claims.190 
Ernst & Young, Inc., the court-appointed monitor and foreign 
representative for Metcalfe, sought United States recognition of the Canadian 
proceeding, including its claims procedure, under chapter 15.191 The 
bankruptcy court, in considering whether to recognize the Canadian 
proceeding, raised the § 1506 exception sua sponte.192 The bankruptcy court 
recognized that § 1506 should be construed narrowly and held that the relief 
available in the foreign proceeding need not match the relief the bankruptcy 
court would provide.193 Instead, the bankruptcy court held that courts should 
not judge the appropriateness of the actions of the foreign court but rather 
determine “whether the procedures used in Canada meet our fundamental 
standards of fairness.”194 The court looked to Second Circuit precedent, which 
significantly restricted bankruptcy courts’ ability to grant releases to non-
 
 184 See In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 185 Id. at 690. In the ABCP market, money used to purchase new ABCP was used to purchase financial 
assets that would then support the repayment of each ABCP. Because of the lack of transparency in the ABCP 
market, some feared that the sub-prime mortgage crisis would negatively impact the value of the underlying 
assets in the ABCP. Investors stopped buying ABCP, and as more and more ABCP became due, the asset 
providers had no money with which to repay them. Id. at 689–90. 
 186 Id. at 689–90. 
 187 Id. at 692. The third-party release “provide[d] each participant in the Canadian ABCP market . . . with 
a release that protect[ed] them from liability and actions . . . in any way related to the third-party ABCP market 
in Canada.” Id. 
 188 Id. at 693. 
 189 Id. at 687. At the time the Canadian Proceeding commenced, these outstanding obligations were 
valued at “approximately CAN$ 32 billion.” Id. 
 190 See id. at 692. 
 191 Id. at 687. 
 192 See id. at 697. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. (citing Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
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debtors; however, as the court noted, such releases are not prohibited per se but 
may be approved if necessary to the success of a reorganization plan.195 The 
court therefore held that because the Canadian proceeding reflected a similar 
restraint regarding such releases, granting recognition of the Canadian 
proceeding would not violate § 1506.196 
This case is illustrative in two ways. First, the court held that simply 
because the foreign court would produce a different result than a United States 
court does not necessarily constitute a violation of fundamental public 
policy.197 Second, the court noted, albeit briefly, that fairness is a fundamental 
policy of the United States.198 While the § 1506 objections failed in In re Iida 
and In re Ernst & Young because they did not claim a fundamental policy,199 
the court in In re Metcalfe did not find a § 1506 exception because the 
fundamental policy, fairness, was not threatened merely because the foreign 
court did not provide the same solution as a United States court.200 
Building off the preceding cases, the Southern District of New York case, 
RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation), 
provides additional guidance on how to analyze a § 1506 claim.201 The district 
court held that a fundamental policy is not violated because a helpful or even 
preferred tool for implementing that policy is not present in the foreign 
proceeding, provided the proceeding otherwise protects that policy.202 The case 
involved Muscletech Research and Development, Inc., a Canada-based 
company that marketed ephedra-containing products in the United States 
before the FDA banned ephedra.203 As a result of consumer litigation, 
Muscletech filed for bankruptcy in the Ontario Superior Court, and RSM 
Richter was appointed monitor (Monitor).204 The Monitor applied for 
recognition of the Muscletech insolvency proceeding as a foreign main 
proceeding, which the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New 
 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. at 697–98. 
 197 See id. at 697. 
 198 Id. (citing Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 457 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
 199 Iida v. Kitahara (In re Iida), 377 B.R. 243, 259 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 
B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008).  
 200 See In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. at 697–98. 
 201 RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 B.R. 333, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006). 
 202 Id. at 337 (“[T]he Procedure here in issue, as amended, plainly affords claimants a fair and impartial 
proceeding.”). 
 203 Id. at 334. 
 204 Id. 
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York granted.205 The Ontario court negotiated and approved a claims 
procedure to value the plaintiffs’ claims.206 The district court granted the 
Monitor’s motion for recognition of the claims procedure “contingent on the 
Ontario court’s approving certain amendments to the Procedure designed to 
assure greater clarity and procedural fairness.”207 Several U.S. plaintiffs 
objected to recognition of the claims procedure as a violation of § 1506 
because it did not include a jury trial, a right to which they would have been 
entitled if they had brought their claims in the United States.208 
The district court began its analysis by recognizing that the § 1506 
exception should be construed narrowly and restricted to only the most 
fundamental policies of the United States.209 The court examined a case 
decided the previous year that recognized a foreign judgment that was rendered 
without a jury.210 That court found that, despite not providing for a jury, the 
foreign court included “substantially the same substantive and procedural due 
process protections.”211 The district court held: 
Obviously, the constitutional right to a jury trial is an important 
component of our legal system, and [28 U.S.C.] § 1411 stresses its 
importance in the context of personal injury cases. But the notion that 
a fair and impartial verdict cannot be rendered in the absence of a 
jury trial defies the experience of most of the civilized world.212 
Rather than holding that the right to a jury was a fundamental public policy, 
the court emphasized the purpose of a jury is to protect litigants from any 
unfairness during a trial.213 The objecting plaintiffs argued the lack of a jury 
trial would hinder their bargaining position, but the court held that such a 
hindrance did not constitute “fundamental unfairness.”214 The court found the 
Ontario court adopted amendments to the claims procedure that ensured due 
process, so the claims procedure was a fair hearing and should be granted 
 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. 
 207 Id. The Ontario court approved the amendments within three weeks of the U.S. Court’s order. Id. 
 208 Id. at 335. 
 209 Id. at 336. 
 210 Id. at 336–37 (citing Samyang Food Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Corp., No. 5:05-CV-636, 2005 WL 
2711526, at *6–7 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005)). 
 211 Id. at 337 (quoting Samyang Food Co., 2005 WL 2711526, at *6). The Korean court provided the 
rights to notice, legal counsel, to present evidence and witnesses, to examine evidence offered against the 
party, and to appeal to a higher court. Id. 
 212 Id. at 334. 
 213 See id. at 337. 
 214 Id. 
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recognition in the United States.215 Thus, where a fundamental policy of the 
United States is protected in a foreign proceeding, even in the absence of a 
preferred method for pursuing that policy, there is no § 1506 claim.216 
In In re Ephedra, the § 1506 objection failed because a jury trial is not 
necessary to protect a fundamental policy.217 Although the objecting plaintiffs 
did raise a fundamental policy—the notion of fairness and due process—the 
court held that the foreign proceeding adopted procedures to protect that 
policy.218 The court found that a fundamental policy is not contravened merely 
because one possible means for enforcing it is denied.219 The court only 
approved the Canadian proceeding after the Ontario court adopted certain 
procedures to ensure that all claimants would be afforded due process and 
fairness.220 Because a jury trial is not an essential aspect of ensuring due 
process fairness, recognizing a foreign proceeding that lacks a jury is not 
manifestly contrary to public policy.221 
In re Gold & Honey, Ltd. is the first U.S. case to deny comity under the 
§ 1506 exception.222 Although the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
New York correctly invoked § 1506, this case is so exceptional that In re Gold 
& Honey is far beyond the threshold of what § 1506 requires and should not be 
considered a model § 1506 case. The debtors were collectively Gold & Honey, 
Ltd., Gold & Honey, LP, and Almond Jewelers (Debtors).223 The Debtors 
moved their precious metal manufacturing facility to Israel.224 Three years 
later, Israel agreed to guarantee a working line of credit, and the Debtors 
selected the First International Bank of Israel (FIBI) to finance the credit 
line.225 Gold & Honey, LP pledged a floating lien over all of its assets to secure 
 
 215 Id. at 335, 337. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at 337. The court found that the purpose of the jury trial is to protect litigants’ fundamental right to 
fairness. Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See id. 
 220 Id. at 335. 
 221 See id. at 337. 
 222 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 371, 371–73 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 223 Id. at 360–61. Gold & Honey, Ltd. (LTD) was an Israeli corporation that was also a general partner 
and a 49.5% equity holder of Gold & Honey, LP (LP), a New York limited partnership. Id. LP’s main business 
was the design, manufacture, and sale of jewelry around the world. Id. at 361. LP’s designing, marketing and 
management was located primarily in New York. Id. at 360–61. Almond Jewelers (Almond) was a New York 
corporation and a general partner and 49.5% equity holder of LP. Id. at 361. 
 224 Id. at 361. 
 225 Id. at 361–62. The Debtors’ primary bank accounts were at FIBI. Id. at 362. 
NOLAN GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 11:21 AM 
204 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
the credit line.226 The credit line initially was $9 million, later increased to $12 
million, and then increased once again to $16 million.227 
Shortly after the final extension of their credit line, FIBI seized almost all 
of the Debtors’ assets and accounts, and began an Israeli receivership 
proceeding.228 Two months later, the Debtors filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in the United States.229 Despite the imposition of the automatic stay upon filing 
for chapter 11, FIBI continued to pursue the Israeli receivership proceeding.230 
The Debtors applied to the bankruptcy court for an order that said the 
automatic stay applied to the Debtors’ property regardless of location and, 
more importantly, to the Israeli receivership proceeding.231 FIBI specially 
appeared to argue that the automatic stay did not apply because courts in the 
United States did not have jurisdiction over either FIBI or the receivership 
proceeding.232 The court disagreed with FIBI and issued an order, pursuant to 
§ 541(a), applying the automatic stay to all of the Debtors’ property “wherever 
located and by whomever held.”233 The stay order also precluded “the 
commencement or continuation . . . of a judicial, administrative, or other action 
or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced 
before the commencement of the case under this title.”234 
 
 226 Id. at 362. LP also pledged some of its machinery and equipment. Id. 
 227 Id. LTD and LP pledged additional machinery and equipment to secure the final increase to $16 
million. Id. Dollar amounts are in U.S. dollars. 
 228 Id. The court does not explain why FIBI chose to commence this litigation. See id. There was no 
mention of any default or breach on the part of the Debtors. See id. Further, Almond is not a party to the 
receivership proceeding. Id. at 360 n.6. A receivership proceeding is a proceeding in which a receiver is 
appointed to preserve the property of the estate for the benefit of the creditors. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1383 (9th ed. 2009). 
 229 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 363. The U.S. bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over LTD, 
despite LTD being a foreign corporation, because § 109(a) allows anyone who resides or has a domicile, place 
of business, or property in the United States to file for bankruptcy in U.S. courts. Id. at 360 n.7. 
 230 Id. at 363. FIBI argued to the Israeli court that the automatic stay should not apply to FIBI or FIBI’s 
attempts to seize LTD and LP’s property because the automatic stay stems from the U.S. chapter 11 cases and 
not any Israeli case. Id. FIBI sought and obtained the appointment of a receiver who then began to actively 
supervise the Debtors’ business. Id. The Debtors maintain that they did not voluntarily agree to this 
appointment, but rather signed under pressure. Id. at 363 n.10. 
 231 Id. at 363. 
 232 Id.  
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. at 363–64. The Court did not explicitly address whether the stay applied to the Israeli receivership 
proceeding, but it warned FIBI that if FIBI chose to pursue the receivership proceeding, it would be at FIBI’s 
own risk. Id. at 363. 
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Disregarding the bankruptcy court’s stay order, FIBI pursued the Israeli 
receivership proceeding.235 The Israeli court heard evidence regarding the stay 
order but ruled that the automatic stay still did not apply and allowed the 
receivership proceeding to continue.236 The Debtors then began an adversary 
proceeding in the bankruptcy court and sought a temporary restraining order 
against FIBI.237 The bankruptcy court denied the motion for a temporary 
restraining order because it “would be redundant to the automatic stay,” which 
prohibited FIBI from pursuing the receivership proceeding.238 FIBI then filed a 
motion to lift the automatic stay with the bankruptcy court, and the permanent 
receivers filed for recognition of the Israeli receivership proceeding as a 
foreign main proceeding under chapter 15.239 
The bankruptcy court denied the receivers’ petition for recognition on 
several grounds. First, the court held that the receivers failed to present 
evidence to satisfy the threshold of § 101(23), which defines a “foreign 
proceeding” as “collective” in nature.240 The bankruptcy court held that the 
receivers had not demonstrated that the receivership proceeding was collective 
in nature, and thus the court could not recognize it as either a foreign main or 
nonmain proceeding.241 Additionally, the court reasoned that even if the 
receivership proceeding was collective in nature, recognition should be denied 
with respect to both LP and LTD because the proceeding was taken in 
violation of the automatic stay and because recognition “would have an 
adverse effect on public policy, pursuant to [§] 1506.”242 The court denied 
recognition because FIBI pursued the receivership proceeding “in spite of and 
in the face of this Court’s Stay Order.”243 Strongly condemning FIBI’s actions, 
the bankruptcy court said, “It would fly in the face of the Code for this Court to 
recognize the petitions here and authorize the post-petition appointed 
 
 235 Id. at 364. 
 236 Id. The U.S. Court noted the Israeli court’s analysis was flawed because the Israeli court failed to 
recognize that § 362 automatically applies. Id. at 364 n.12. 
 237 Id. at 364. While the bankruptcy court was considering this motion, the Israeli court appointed 
permanent receivers. Id. FIBI then moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding and included the Israeli court’s 
ruling in the receivership proceeding. Id. 
 238 Id. at 365. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 367–68 (interpreting 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2006)). 
 241 Id. at 369–70. The bankruptcy court also held that, with respect to LP, the receivers failed to prove that 
a foreign court properly had control or supervision over LP’s assets, as required by § 101(23). Id. at 371–73. 
 242 Id. at 368. 
 243 Id. 
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Receivers to proceed in the United States when they were appointed as a result 
of a knowing and willful violation of the automatic stay by FIBI.”244  
Finally, the bankruptcy court held that granting recognition of the 
receivership proceeding would be manifestly contrary to public policy.245 
Despite the narrow construction of § 1506, the court held that granting 
recognition of the receivership proceeding “would reward and legitimize 
FIBI’s violation of both the automatic stay and this Court’s Orders regarding 
the stay.”246 The court distinguished In re Gold & Honey from In re Ernst & 
Young because In re Ernst & Young did not involve a fundamental policy.247 
The court also distinguished In re Ephedra by finding that, although the 
fundamental policy of procedural fairness was at stake, the In re Ephedra court 
had taken sufficient steps to protect procedural fairness before granting 
recognition.248 
Here, the bankruptcy court explicitly held that there were fundamental 
policy interests at stake, specifically the extent of U.S. courts’ jurisdiction in 
bankruptcy and the importance of the automatic stay.249 If the court recognized 
the receivership proceeding, it would restrict federal jurisdiction over a 
debtor’s property “wherever located and by whomever held.”250 Further, if the 
court granted recognition, it would diminish the value of the automatic stay, a 
fundamental component of the United States bankruptcy system.251 FIBI acted, 
and the Israeli court ruled, on the theory that the bankruptcy court’s stay order 
must have first been registered as a foreign judgment in Israel before it had any 
impact.252 The Israeli court further held that the bankruptcy court did not have 
jurisdiction over a debtor’s assets in a foreign country without the aid of the 
foreign court.253 If the bankruptcy court granted recognition of the receivership 
proceeding, it would limit United States courts’ jurisdiction over a debtor’s 
 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. at 371. 
 246 Id. at 371–72. 
 247 Id. at 372 (citing In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008)). 
 248 Id. (citing RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 B.R. 333, 334–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)). 
 249 Id. 
 250 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) 
(giving the district court reviewing a title 11 case exclusive jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever 
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of the case, and of property of the estate”). 
 251 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372. 
 252 Id. at 368. 
 253 Id. at 369. 
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worldwide assets, despite clear statutory language to the contrary.254 The court 
refused to recognize the Israeli receivership proceeding due to the “serious 
ramifications that would ensue in derogation of fundamental United States 
policies.”255 
Although In re Gold & Honey is the first case finding an exception to the 
rule of comity under § 1506, it does not demonstrate the threshold violation to 
invoke § 1506. The court found three separate reasons why recognition of the 
foreign proceeding would be manifestly contrary to public policy,256 but each 
of those reasons individually would have been sufficient to satisfy even a 
narrow construction of § 1506. First, although the court did not explicitly hold 
FIBI’s malfeasance to be a controlling factor, the court noted that “allowing 
the offensive use of a stay violation here would severely impinge the value and 
import of the automatic stay.”257 Notwithstanding the impact on the automatic 
stay’s significance, the court would be validating FIBI’s “knowing and willful” 
misconduct if it granted FIBI’s petition.258 Allowing a foreign representative to 
violate direct orders from United States courts and then force United States 
courts to grant recognition based on international comity would harm the 
legitimacy of the United States court system. Such a ruling would create an 
incentive for other foreign representatives to ignore or violate unfavorable 
United States rulings and would permit foreign representatives to force the 
United States court to comply under the guise of comity.259 Recognizing the 
receivership proceeding would therefore be manifestly contrary to public 
policy.260 
Second, if the bankruptcy court granted recognition of the receivership 
proceeding, the impact on the authority of United States courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over a debtor’s assets, irrespective of where the assets are located, 
 
 254 Id. at 372–73; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (giving the district court reviewing a 
title 11 case exclusive jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the 
commencement of the case, and of property of the estate”). 
 255 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372–73. 
 256 Id. at 371–73. 
 257 Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
 258 Id. at 368, 372. 
 259 See id. at 368–69, 371–72. 
 260 See id. at 373. This does not suggest that § 1506 does or should require a foreign representative’s 
knowing malfeasance before denying recognition. Nothing in either the text of the statute or its legislative 
history suggests such a requirement. See 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006); see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I) (2005), at 
88, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172. Rather, it would be manifestly contrary to public policy to enable 
a foreign representative to violate a court order and then seek recognition of that violation under the guise of 
international comity. See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 373.  
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would contravene fundamental public policy.261 In two separate statutes, 
Congress provided that a U.S. court’s jurisdiction over a debtor’s property does 
not stop at the U.S. border. First, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) defines the debtor’s estate 
as including “all of the following property, wherever located and by whomever 
held.”262 Even the Israeli court recognized that this provision authorized a 
“broad, worldwide grant of jurisdiction . . . over a debtor’s assets wherever 
located.”263 Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) provides that district courts and 
bankruptcy courts shall have sole jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever 
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of the case.”264 If U.S. courts 
were not able to exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s property held abroad, it 
would hinder the efficient administration of the bankruptcy case.265 More 
importantly, it would incentivize debtors to move their property out of the 
country to avoid creditors. The bankruptcy court found that if it granted 
recognition, “any future creditor could follow FIBI’s lead and violate the stay 
in order to procure assets that were outside the United States, yet still under the 
United States court’s jurisdiction.”266 
Finally, the bankruptcy court held that recognition of the receivership 
proceeding would be manifestly contrary to public policy because FIBI 
pursued the proceeding despite the imposition of the automatic stay.267 
Irrespective of FIBI’s and the Israeli court’s reasoning, it “is axiomatic that 
when the [c]hapter 11 [c]ases were filed, the automatic stay went into 
effect.”268 The automatic stay is essential to the bankruptcy system and serves 
to freeze all actions regarding the debtor and the debtor’s estate.269 It “give[s] 
the debtor a breathing spell from litigation and collection activities,”270 but 
may benefit creditors as well. The automatic stay prevents any particular 
creditor from gaining an unfair advantage over other creditors by quickly 
seizing assets.271 Just as importantly, the automatic stay allows a court to 
assess each creditor’s claim as it exists at the moment of filing and provides an 
 
 261 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372–73. 
 262 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). 
 263 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 369. 
 264 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1). 
 265 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372.  
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 372–73. 
 268 Id. at 368; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). 
 269 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 369. 
 270 Id. (citing Interstate Commerce Comm’n v. Holmes Transp., Inc., 931 F.2d 984, 987–88 (1st Cir. 
1991)). 
 271 See id. at 372. 
NOLAN GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 11:21 AM 
2011] A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 209 
efficient means for distribution on the basis of the creditor’s relative priority.272 
The fact that the automatic stay applies the moment the debtor files for 
bankruptcy without the need for any other affirmative act demonstrates the 
automatic stay’s importance for the administration of a bankruptcy case.273 
Therefore, since “actions taken in violation of the stay are void,”274 FIBI’s 
contravention of the automatic stay and the receiver’s appointment constituted 
grounds for a § 1506 exception because they undermine these fundamental 
policies.275 
In re Gold & Honey provides two examples of when it is appropriate for 
the court to invoke § 1506. First, courts should not cooperate with a foreign 
proceeding when doing so would condone a violation of the stay276 because the 
automatic stay is indispensable in the American bankruptcy system.277 Second, 
In re Gold & Honey correctly suggests that comity should be denied under 
§ 1506 when a petition for recognition threatens a fundamental public policy 
and the court is not able to otherwise protect that policy.278 
The only other case to date to invoke the § 1506 exception to deny 
recognition to a foreign proceeding is In re Toft.279 Like In re Gold & Honey, 
there were multiple grounds on which to deny recognition under § 1506.280 The 
debtor, Dr. Jürgen Toft, was a surgeon in Germany with more than $7 million 
in debt.281 Apparently, Toft did not cooperate with the German insolvency 
proceeding and attempted to hide some assets outside of Europe.282 To assist 
 
 272 Id. 
 273 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); see also id. § 1520(a)(1) (providing that § 362 applies upon recognition of a 
proceeding under chapter 15). 
 274 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 369 (citing 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc. v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 
(In re 48th St. Steakhouse, Inc.), 61 B.R. 182, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d, 77 B.R. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987), aff’d, 835 F.2d 427 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 275 See id. at 371–73. 
 276 Id. at 369, 372–73. 
 277 The automatic stay is necessary for the fair and efficient administration of the bankruptcy case, and 
thus applies immediately upon filing, with no other affirmative action required. See, e.g., WARREN & 
WESTBROOK, supra note 151, at 131 (“Eventually, the court will oversee the gathering and distribution of the 
assets, but until that time or until the stay is lifted, creditors are generally precluded from taking any individual 
action against the . . . estate.”); see also 3 COLLIER, supra note 75, ¶ 362.02 (“The stay is effective 
automatically and immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, whether voluntary, joint[,] or 
involuntary. Formal service of process is not required, and no particular notice need be given in order to 
subject a party to the stay.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 278 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372. 
 279 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 280 Id. at 196–201. 
 281 Id. at 188. 
 282 Id. 
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Dr. Martin Prager, the insolvency administrator, the German Court entered an 
order authorizing Prager “to intercept Toft’s postal and electronic mail.”283 
Prager then filed the chapter 15 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of New York because Toft’s email accounts were stored on 
servers that belonged to internet service providers (ISPs) located in the United 
States.284 Toft had no assets in, nor any other evident connection to, the United 
States.285 In initiating the chapter 15 proceeding, Prager did not provide any 
notice to Toft, and Prager “requested no notice be required if relief is granted 
so that [Prager] can continue to investigate the affairs of” Toft without his 
knowledge.286 Prager also asked the court to grant comity to the German mail 
interception order by compelling the ISPs “to disclose to Prager all of the 
Debtor’s e-mails currently store on their servers and to deliver to Prager copies 
of all e-mails received by the Debtor in the future.”287 
After reiterating that the public policy exception should be construed 
narrowly,288 the court denied Prager’s requests under § 1506 because the relief 
sought would be manifestly contrary to public policy.289 The court based its 
decision on the implications for Toft’s privacy rights and the lack of notice to 
Toft. First, the court held that Prager’s request for all past and future emails 
would violate both statutory and constitutional rights.290 Specifically, the court 
found that numerous statutes protect the privacy of electronic 
communications.291 These statutes require that to lawfully obtain electronic 
communications without the consent of the recipient, a court must issue a 
warrant upon a showing of necessity.292 Further, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act “imposes criminal and civil penalties when a 
person ‘accesses an electronic communication service, or obtains an electronic 
communication while it is still in storage, without authorization.’”293 The court 
held that United States law forbade the relief requested and would, in fact, 
 
 283 Id. Under the belief that Toft was in London, Prager successfully sought to have the interception order 
enforced by the English High Court of Justice. Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. at 189. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Id. at 193. 
 289 Id. at 189, 201. 
 290 Id. at 196–200. 
 291 Id. at 196–97. 
 292 Id. at 197. 
 293 Id. (quoting Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d. 548, 555 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasis omitted)). 
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likely result in criminal liability for Prager if he performed the wiretap without 
a warrant.294 Because “[t]he relief sought would directly compromise privacy 
rights subject to a comprehensive scheme of statutory protection, available to 
aliens, built on constitutional safeguards incorporated in the Fourth 
Amendment,” the court denied Prager’s request under § 1506.295 
However, the court did not base its decision on privacy rights alone. Prager 
pursued his motion for relief without any notice to Toft and requested that the 
court not provide any notice if relief were granted.296 Under Bankruptcy Rule 
2002(q)(1), the court must provide notice to the debtor when a chapter 15 
petition is filed.297 If the court were to grant the relief Prager requested, it 
would be violating both Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure and procedural due 
process rights.298 Therefore, the court denied the relief sought under § 1506 
because it would be manifestly contrary to public policy.299 
While In re Toft properly found a § 1506 exception, this case does not 
demonstrate the threshold required to invoke § 1506 because the court found 
multiple reasons to deny Prager’s request, two of which alone would have been 
sufficient to deny Prager’s request.300 First, the court held that because the mail 
interception order would violate United States law regarding privacy in 
communications, the relief should be denied as manifestly contrary to public 
policy.301 The privacy policy interest embodied in these statutory protections 
rises to the level of a fundamental policy because they are grounded, at least 
partially, in the Fourth Amendment.302 The mail interception order would 
amount to a warrantless search and seizure of Toft’s email.303 It is important to 
note that the court did not reach the question of whether the relief requested 
violated constitutional guarantees of privacy because it is not entirely clear 
whether those constitutional guarantees were available to Toft, a foreign 
 
 294 Id. at 198. 
 295 Id. 
 296 Id. at 189. 
 297 Id. at 200; see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(q)(1). 
 298 In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 198, 200. 
 299 Id. at 200. 
 300 Id. at 196–201. The second of the court’s reasons, that the relief requested would be beyond the power 
of an U.S. estate representative, would not be sufficient to invoke § 1506 without more because the relief 
available in the foreign proceeding need not be identical to the relief available in the United States. See, e.g., In 
re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 301 In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 196–98. 
 302 See id. at 197–98. 
 303 Id. 
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national who was not in the United States.304 Nevertheless, the court found that 
the right to privacy in electronic communications was fundamental because 
there was a “comprehensive scheme of statutory protection” based on 
constitutional guarantees.305 Therefore, because Prager requested relief that 
would violate the fundamental policy of protecting the privacy of 
communications, the court denied his motion under § 1506.306 
Even if the violation of privacy rights were not sufficient to invoke § 1506, 
the lack of notice to Toft, and therefore the lack of procedural due process, 
justifies the court’s decision to deny the relief requested.307 The court’s 
analysis on this point was brief and focused primarily on Bankruptcy Rule 
2002, but the § 1506 issue on this point goes much deeper than the Bankruptcy 
Rules of Procedure. One of the most important considerations for courts when 
determining whether to grant recognition to a foreign proceeding is whether 
the foreign proceeding is fair and assures procedural due process.308 In this 
case, Prager requested relief that would deny Toft due process by failing to 
provide notice of either the hearing or of any relief the court granted.309 
Because the relief would violate the fundamental policy of due process, the 
court correctly invoked § 1506 to deny Prager’s motion. 
Like In re Gold & Honey, In re Toft is still useful for understanding the 
§ 1506 analysis, even though it does not answer the “threshold” question of 
when courts should invoke § 1506. In re Toft presents two occasions on which 
a court could invoke § 1506,310 while presenting a third that would be 
insufficient.311 This juxtaposition demonstrates that even though the relief 
available may be different under foreign law, that law should be respected 
unless it violates a fundamental policy of the United States.312 Here, because 
the foreign law violated both communications privacy, based in part on the 
 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 198. 
 306 Id. 
 307 See id. at 200. 
 308 See RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 B.R. 333, 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. 685, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also Hilton v. 
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202–03 (1895); In re Hourani, 180 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 309 In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 189, 200. 
 310 Those occasions are the violation of communications privacy and the lack of notice provided to the 
debtor. Id. at 196–98, 200–01. 
 311 The court discussed that Prager requested relief that would be beyond the power of a similar United 
States representative. Id. at 198–200. However, that alone is insufficient to qualify for a § 1506 exception. See, 
e.g., In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. at 697–98. 
 312 See, e.g., In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. at 697–98. 
NOLAN GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 11:21 AM 
2011] A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM 213 
Fourth Amendment, and due process protections, based in part on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the court properly denied Prager’s motion under 
§ 1506.313 
The limited § 1506 case law to date demonstrates several important points. 
The principles of international cooperation and comity are strong guiding 
concepts that compel United States courts to grant recognition of a foreign 
proceeding despite potentially producing a different or less desirable result 
than a U.S. proceeding.314 International cooperation is not an absolute rule, 
though, and § 1506 gives bankruptcy courts some discretion in whether to 
cooperate with a foreign proceeding. However, the policy exception in § 1506 
should be construed narrowly,315 and the limited case law on point has done 
so.316 As a matter of law, a party must claim that a fundamental policy is 
threatened by recognition of a foreign proceeding to invoke § 1506.317 Even 
absent an efficient means for protecting a fundamental policy, the United 
States court still should recognize foreign proceedings as long as the 
fundamental policy is otherwise protected.318 When foreign law or a foreign 
proceeding does violate a fundamental policy of the United States, the court 
may deny recognition under § 1506.319 The major failure of these cases is that 
they fail to articulate what makes a policy “fundamental,” even though they 
name several fundamental policies. This Comment will next explore what 
makes a policy “fundamental” and why advancing the growth of intellectual 
property should be considered a fundamental policy.  
 
 313 In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 201. Again, although the court did not rely on or substantially analyze a 
constitutional argument, these policies are fundamental because they are grounded in the text of the 
constitution and in the history and traditions of the United States. See infra Part III.A. 
 314 See In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alt. Invs., 421 B.R. at 697; see also In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 
B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (granting recognition to a foreign proceeding even though the creditors 
would receive less than in a United States proceeding). 
 315 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172 (2005); see 
also MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 2, para. 89. 
 316 See Mund, supra note 149, at 340–48, 356. 
 317 See Iida v. Kitahara (In re Iida), 377 B.R. 243, 259 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). 
 318 RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 BR 333, 335–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that the absence of a jury trial is not grounds for denying recognition under § 1506 where the foreign 
proceeding adopts other measures to ensure procedural due process). 
 319 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006). 
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III.  THE FUNDAMENTAL PUBLIC POLICY OF ADVANCING AND PROTECTING 
THE GROWTH OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The section that follows begins by analyzing what makes something 
“fundamental” to the United States in a nonbankruptcy context and analogizing 
that definition to bankruptcy law, specifically § 1506. Next, this Comment 
argues that, using the nonbankruptcy “fundamental” definition, the policy of 
protecting intellectual property licenses is sufficiently “fundamental” to justify 
a § 1506 exception in a chapter 15 bankruptcy case. Finally, this Comment 
suggests several solutions to ensure that the security of intellectual property 
licenses does not rely on the licensor’s financial success. 
A. Defining “Fundamental” and the Importance of Advancing Intellectual 
Property 
While the case law demonstrates that § 1506 should only be invoked to 
protect fundamental policies of the United States, there is no clear explanation 
of what makes a policy “fundamental” in either bankruptcy case law or 
elsewhere in the Code. Consequently, it is necessary to look to other areas of 
United States law to determine what policies can be considered “fundamental” 
and, therefore, when bankruptcy courts should invoke § 1506. With that in 
mind, there is substantial relevant case law regarding the Equal Protection and 
Due Process clauses;320 while these cases do not involve the Code or 
insolvency proceedings, the established doctrine provides an analogous 
framework for what makes a right “fundamental.”321 That framework can then 
be applied to bankruptcy law to demonstrate which policies of the United 
States are sufficiently “fundamental” to justify a § 1506 exception. In this 
context, there are numerous approaches to determining fundamental rights, but 
this Comment focuses on two: the originalist approach and the historical 
approach. This section will show that both of these approaches support the 
conclusion that advancing intellectual property is a fundamental policy of the 
United States. 
The originalist position is premised on the idea that, when deciding 
whether something is “fundamental,” courts should confine themselves to the 
original meaning and the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution.322 
 
 320 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 321 See, e.g., David Schraub, Comment, The Price of Victory: Political Triumphs and Judicial Protection 
in the Gay Rights Movement, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1437, 1441–42 (2010). 
 322 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 795 (3d ed. 2006). 
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Under this approach, a right or a policy is only fundamental when it is 
explicitly stated in the text or clearly intended thereby.323 For example, the 
right to vote is explicitly protected in the Constitution in multiple places.324 A 
strict originalist approach would conclude that, because the right to vote is 
plainly covered in the Constitution, it is fundamental; in fact, the Supreme 
Court has held that the right to vote is a fundamental right.325  
Under the originalist approach, promoting intellectual property is a 
fundamental policy of the United States. The Constitution explicitly directs 
Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” referring to 
copyright and patent law, respectively.326 Article I, which contains the 
Intellectual Property Clause, vests in Congress certain powers327 and charges it 
with specific responsibilities. Promoting the growth and development of 
intellectual property is a fundamental policy of the United States because it is 
one of the few policies the Constitution explicitly directs Congress to 
pursue.328 
Another main approach to determining whether a right or a policy is 
fundamental looks to the historical importance of that right or policy.329 Under 
this approach, a right or policy is fundamental when it is “deeply rooted in this 
 
 323 See, e.g., id.  
 324 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1 
(“The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for [various federal offices] 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other 
tax.”). 
 325 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (holding that voting is a “fundamental” right 
because it is “preservative of all rights”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to 
vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society . . . .”). While these cases 
did not explicitly rely on a textualist rationale, they reach the same conclusion that the right to vote is a 
fundamental right. Furthermore, although the right to vote in any election is not constitutionally protected, see, 
for example, San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1972), voting in federal elections 
is nevertheless a fundamental right because Amendment XXIV explicitly protects that right. See Reynolds, 377 
U.S. at 567 (“To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.”). 
 326 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is known as the Intellectual Property Clause. Menell, supra note 15, 
at 738. 
 327 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 328 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 329 See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 322, at 795. 
NOLAN GALLEYSFINAL2 12/13/2011 11:21 AM 
216 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 28 
Nation’s history and tradition,”330 or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”331 The historical approach has been a particularly productive approach 
for arguing that a right is fundamental because there are so few explicitly 
enumerated in the Constitution. The Supreme Court has found a number of 
fundamental rights in this manner: for example, the right to family in Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland.332 Moore involved a statute restricting the occupancy 
of a single dwelling unit to a single family, and the statute’s definition of 
“family” did not include a grandmother and two grandsons living together.333 
In finding the law unconstitutional, the plurality held that the right to family, 
including living with one’s extended family, is fundamental because that right 
is ingrained in the history and traditions of the United States: 
The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents 
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally 
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition. . . . [I]t 
has been common for close relatives to draw together and participate 
in the duties and the satisfactions of a common home. . . . 
Whether or not such a household is established because of 
personal tragedy, the choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to 
live together may not be lightly denied by the State.334 
The Court held that the rights to family and to include extended family in a 
household are fundamental rights because families in the United States have 
historically been defined to include relatives beyond parents and children.335 
Similarly, scientific progress and innovation have consistently been a part 
of the traditions of the United States, and laws protecting intellectual property 
have been around since the first Congress. That first Congress passed both the 
Copyright Act of 1790336 and the Patent Act of 1790.337 These Acts have been 
revised and reformed many times, from alterations to the length of time they 
provide protection to the subject matter they cover,338 but there has always 
 
 330 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 
588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[F]undamental rights . . . are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition . . . .’” (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))). 
 331 See Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  
 332 Moore, 431 U.S. 494. 
 333 Id. at 495–98.  
 334 Id. at 504–06 (footnotes omitted). 
 335 See id. at 505–06. 
 336 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1803). 
 337 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
 338 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 553, 66 Stat. 792 (expanding coverage to “processes” and 
allowing for a patent to remain valid even if some claims have been invalidated); Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 
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been some form of intellectual property law in the United States. Thus, even as 
United States society has evolved and changed, the protection of intellectual 
property has remained an important tradition.339 Additionally, the United States 
was a party to some of the earliest international intellectual property treaties, 
which further supports the conclusion that promoting the growth of intellectual 
property has long been an important goal of the United States.340 Under this 
nontextual, historical approach to the “fundamental” analysis, protecting and 
promoting intellectual property is fundamental because there has been 
consistent protection for those who invest in creating intellectual property, 
dating back to the first laws of the United States. 
B. Intellectual Property, Licenses, and Bankruptcy 
Only two United States cases to date, In re Gold & Honey and In re Toft, 
have used § 1506 to deny recognition to a foreign proceeding because 
recognition would contravene fundamental policies, and both courts based 
their decisions on multiple grounds.341 The court in In re Gold & Honey denied 
the foreign representative’s petition for recognition because the foreign 
proceeding occurred in violation of direct court orders.342 While the court did 
not discuss this point in depth, allowing actions under these circumstances 
would harm the legitimacy of the court’s authority.343 A court’s authority over 
litigants is fundamental because it is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”344 Further, the court held that 
 
5 Stat. 117 (creating the Patent Office and hiring of a Patent Examiner to analyze the prior art before 
acceptance of an application) (repealed 1870); see also Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-551, 90 Stat. 
2541 (broadening the coverage of protection to works that are fixed rather than only published); Copyright Act 
of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (changing terms of copyrights from fourteen to twenty-eight years and adding 
protection for musical compositions) (repealed 1870). 
 339 See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the Patent Power and the Copyright 
Power, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307 (2005).  
 340 For example, the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was written in 1883 and 
provides for cooperation and clarity regarding intellectual property rights (including, among others, patents, 
industrial designs, and trade names) between all member nations. See Summary of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WIPO.INT, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris. 
html (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). The United States became a contracting party of the Paris Convention in 1887. 
See, e.g., Contracting Parties to Paris Convention, WIPO.INT, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults. 
jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 341 See In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 196–98, 200 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 
B.R. 357, 372–73 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 342 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372. 
 343 See id. 
 344 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 
105 (1934)). 
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granting recognition would affirm a violation of the automatic stay.345 The 
automatic stay serves to “prevent[] one creditor from obtaining an advantage 
over other creditors[] and provid[es] for the efficient and orderly distribution of 
a debtor’s assets to all creditors.”346 Finally, the court held that granting 
recognition would harm the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.347 Two separate 
statutes grant federal courts jurisdiction over a debtor’s property “wherever 
located and by whomever held.”348 This broad grant of jurisdiction is 
fundamental to an effective bankruptcy system because it prevents a debtor 
from simply moving his property out of the United States to avoid his 
creditors.349 
The court in In re Toft denied the foreign representative’s motion to allow 
delivery of the debtor’s present and future emails without the debtor’s 
permission because the relief would violate “a comprehensive scheme of 
statutory protection . . . built on constitutional safeguards.”350 The foreign 
representative did not have a warrant, and, if the court had granted the foreign 
representative’s motion, the relief would have triggered criminal liability.351 
Additionally, the foreign representative requested that the relief be granted 
without any notice to the debtor,352 which would violate both Bankruptcy Rule 
2002 specifically353 and procedural due process generally. Ensuring fairness 
and due process is a fundamental policy of the United States because it is 
protected by the Constitution, via the Fourteenth Amendment.354 Further, 
protecting fairness and due process is one of the primary considerations in 
determining whether to extend comity to a foreign proceeding.355 
Promoting intellectual property is a fundamental policy that justifies a 
§ 1506 exception.356 Furthermore, protecting intellectual property licensees’ 
rights and securing a strong licensing market is a critical part of promoting the 
growth of intellectual property and should itself be protected under § 1506.357 
 
 345 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372. 
 346 Id. 
 347 Id. at 372–73. 
 348 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1). 
 349 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372. 
 350 In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 351 Id. 
 352 Id. at 189. 
 353 Id. at 200. 
 354 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 355 See supra Part II. 
 356 See supra Part III.A. 
 357 See generally infra text accompanying notes 367–401. 
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The parallels between this conclusion and the implicit reasoning in In re Gold 
& Honey are easy to demonstrate. The Constitution explicitly directs Congress 
to establish a federal bankruptcy system;358 the first attempts at establishing 
such a system were as early as 1800,359 but the first bankruptcy law that was 
able to endure more than a few years was the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.360 Both 
the originalist and historical approaches for defining “fundamental” thus 
support the conclusion that maintaining a stable and effective bankruptcy 
system is a fundamental policy of the United States.361 The automatic stay and 
worldwide jurisdiction over a debtor’s property are both critical components of 
the Code,362 and the court in In re Gold & Honey properly invoked § 1506 to 
protect them. Permitting or validating a violation of either the stay or 
worldwide jurisdiction would substantially contravene the fundamental policy 
of maintaining a bankruptcy system; therefore, the stay and worldwide 
jurisdiction are themselves fundamental and justify a § 1506 exception when 
threatened.363 
As licensing is an equivalently essential part of promoting the growth of 
intellectual property, it should be considered a fundamental policy as well. 
Failing to protect the licensees of intellectual property substantially impedes 
the growth of intellectual property by removing one of the main sources of 
revenue for inventors and creators.364 In purely domestic bankruptcy cases, 
bankruptcy law recognizes this connection and protects such licenses in 
§ 365(n).365 Indeed, the fact that § 1520366 does not specifically include 
§ 365(n), or even § 365 more broadly, does not negate the fundamental nature 
of protecting intellectual property licenses. For example, § 1520 makes no 
mention of either § 541 or 28 U.S.C. § 1334, both of which establish that 
 
 358 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on 
the subject of Bankruptcies . . . .”). 
 359 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). 
 360 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-598, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682. 
 361 The originalist approach would emphasize the constitutional warrant to create a bankruptcy system, 
while the historical approach would emphasize the early and continued attempts at creating and maintaining a 
bankruptcy system; regardless, both approaches support the conclusion that having a stable bankruptcy system 
is a fundamental policy of the United States. 
 362 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 372 (2009). 
 363 See id. at 371–73. 
 364 See Menell, supra note 15, at 737. 
 365 See supra Part I.A. 
 366 11 U.S.C. § 1520 (2006) (governing the effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding and 
indentifying certain provisions that automatically apply once the United States court grants recognition). 
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bankruptcy courts have worldwide jurisdiction over a debtor’s property.367 The 
court in In re Gold & Honey held that where granting recognition of a foreign 
proceeding would interfere with worldwide jurisdiction, § 1506 may be 
invoked to protect that fundamental policy, notwithstanding the omission of 
jurisdictional statutes from the automatic application provision.368 Thus, as this 
Comment will now show, protecting intellectual property licenses is a 
fundamental policy of the United States within the meaning of § 1506, despite 
its absence from § 1520. While § 365(n) protects such licenses in purely 
domestic bankruptcies, courts should use § 1506 to extend bankruptcy 
protection of intellectual property licenses to chapter 15 cases. 
A brief overview of patent and copyright law will help demonstrate why 
bankruptcy law, even in cross-border cases, should protect intellectual property 
licenses as it already does domestically with § 365(n). The United States patent 
and copyright systems give the creators exclusive control over their works for 
a limited period of time. Generally, “granting intellectual property rights in 
innovations . . . provide[s] an incentive or reward for the sizeable investments 
needed to create the intellectual property . . . .”369 Granting property rights 
encourages investment into such productive activities by removing the 
possibility of free riders, or parties that may attempt to copy an inventor or 
author’s work. Further, it gives those inventors and authors the ability to 
control the pricing of their products, allowing them to recoup their production 
costs and potentially make a profit by commercializing their intellectual 
property.370 This control over use allows the inventor or author to make money 
by selling the right to use his or her creation by granting licenses.371 In other 
words, “[t]he intellectual property laws are generally concerned with asset 
creation. Therefore, they encourage conditions that promote investment in 
research and development, as well as the maximization of value that can be 
derived from such assets. Much of the value of intellectual property flows from 
licensing goods and services.”372 
This ability to contract freely plays a crucial role in “maximizing the 
potential value of intellectual property by encouraging a robust licensing 
 
 367 See id. § 541(a) (defining the property of the estate to include the debtor’s property “wherever located 
and by whomever held”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (granting the district court “exclusive jurisdiction” over 
all of the property of the debtor “wherever located”). 
 368 In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 372–73. 
 369 John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 439 (2004). 
 370 See Menell, supra note 15, at 738–40. 
 371 Id. at 741. 
 372 Id. at 737. 
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market to exploit the value of intellectual creativity.”373 Economically 
speaking, most individuals will not invest in creating intellectual property 
unless they reasonably believe they will be able to profit from their 
investments.374 Usually, that profit is largely derived from being able to license 
the creation to others or using the creation to create some “competitive 
advantage in the marketplace.”375 The strength of licensing markets thus plays 
a critical role in funding the development of technology and intellectual 
property.376 The relationship between licensing and promoting the growth of 
intellectual property is a fundamental one and distinct from the relationship 
between the right to a jury trial and procedural due process at issue in In re 
Ephedra.377 While a jury trial is a useful tool for ensuring procedure due 
process, it is not necessary, and due process can be assured in other ways.378 
In contrast, licensing is a necessary part of promoting the growth of 
intellectual property because “[l]icensing provides the mechanism by which 
the original innovator can retain sufficient ownership of his innovation so that 
he shares in the ultimate economic reward, while sharing that reward as 
remuneration to those who would provide the financing and refinement 
necessary to achieve economic success.”379 Further, licensing allows people 
other than the creator to exploit the intellectual property in ways that the 
creator may not have imagined because “once [a creator or inventor] becomes 
competent in pursuing one avenue of development, [that creator or inventor] 
may have difficulty keeping track of other potential avenues.”380 Thus, because 
licensing is the primary way authors and inventors recoup their initial costs and 
make a profit, and because licensing allows further development of intellectual 
property in new and different ways, licensing is a crucial part of encouraging 
the development of intellectual property.381 
 
 373 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202. 
 374 See Menell, supra note 15, at 738. 
 375 Id. at 738–39. 
 376 See id. at 741; see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3.  
 377 RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 B.R. 333, 335–37 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
 378 See id. at 335, 337 (finding due process satisfied when the Canadian court adopted certain amendments 
to its claims procedures). 
 379 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3. 
 380 F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
697, 726 (2001); see also S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3 (“Licensing . . . provides a mechanism whereby the 
innovator who has identified more than one domain in which his invention may have application can seek 
partners for each field of use without risking the probability that one developer’s narrow focus will deny him 
the rewards of development in another area.”).  
 381 See Menell, supra note 15, at 741. 
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Failing to protect intellectual property licenses from complete rejection 
under foreign law, in contravention of a fundamental policy, will have a 
disastrous effect on the advancement of intellectual property in the United 
States. If debtor-licensors have the absolute ability to revoke a license, “the 
trustee might seek to rescind licenses in an effort to negotiate better terms.”382 
By the time the licensor has gone into debt, “the licensee may have made 
substantial specific investments in reliance on the continued licensing of 
intellectual property rights.”383 This may mean substantial losses to the 
licensee, potentially leading to bankruptcy, or it may leave the licensee without 
the bargaining power to negotiate a reasonable new license. 
Another problem with leaving intellectual property licenses vulnerable to 
foreign law is that it is not always clear which country’s law will apply. When 
a foreign representative petitions a court for recognition of a foreign 
proceeding, the court can rule that the proceeding is either a main or a nonmain 
proceeding.384 This distinction is important because “the bankruptcy 
proceeding [is] governed in accordance with the bankruptcy laws of the nation 
in which the main case is pending.”385 A main proceeding is one that is 
“pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main 
interests.”386 While there is a presumption that a debtor’s “center of main 
interests” is in the country where it is headquartered, this presumption is not 
absolute.387 Because determining the center of main interests often depends on 
the discretion of the court and there is a lack of certainty about where a court 
will decide the center main of interest is located, “multinational entities are 
burdened by not knowing, at the time of licensing, what jurisdiction’s laws will 
determine the rights . . . under a license . . . .”388 Not applying § 365(n) leaves 
the licensee uncertain about which country would be the licensor’s center of 
main interest, which determines the laws that govern the bankruptcy case.389  
 
 382 Id. at 768. 
 383 Id. 
 384 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1517 (2006). 
 385 In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM, 2009 WL 4060083, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 2009). 
 386 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4). 
 387 See id. § 1516(c). 
 388 Nadine Farid, The Fate of Intellectual Property Assets in Cross-Border Insolvency Proceedings, 44 
GONZ. L. REV. 39, 71 (2008). 
 389 Cf. id. at 68 (noting that foreign main proceedings are in the state where the debtor’s center of main 
interests is located and “the laws of the state housing the main proceeding are the laws which dictate the assets 
within the bankruptcy estate and the rights of the debtor”). 
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Without protecting intellectual property licenses, a business that relies on 
the right to use that intellectual property faces a great deal of risk in entering 
into a license contract.390 The damage done by one party’s bankruptcy should 
be limited so as to prevent additional harm to third parties who relied on the 
license to a substantial degree.391 Failure to protect licenses might lead 
investors to demand assignments392 in order to guarantee they will have the 
right to use the intellectual property.393 The vulnerability of these licenses, 
then, hinders the full development of intellectual property and can cause severe 
financial distress to inventors either by forcing the inventor to give up his legal 
rights to the intellectual property through assignment or by discouraging 
potential licensees from contracting.394 Reliance on sale rather than licensing 
restricts the number of people who can participate in the development of 
technology395 and limits future investment in productive activities. 
With the current law under chapter 15, intellectual property licenses exist in 
a pre-Lubrizol state, vulnerable to complete rejection in the licensor’s 
bankruptcy.396 After Lubrizol, Congress acted to prevent the “threat to the 
development of American Technology” caused by the vulnerability of 
intellectual property licenses in bankruptcy.397 If, however, either Congress or 
the courts fail to act and leave intellectual property licenses vulnerable in 
international bankruptcies, they will continue to allow a substantial obstacle to 
developing science and technology, in derogation of the fundamental policy of 
the United States to promote the growth of intellectual property. Maintaining a 
strong international licensing market, on the other hand, would protect the 
incentives for investing in creative activities.398 Without adequate protection 
for intellectual property licenses in the context of chapter 15 bankruptcies, the 
vulnerability of such licenses will remain “a fundamental threat to the creative 
process that has nurtured innovation in the United States.”399 
 
 390 Id. at 43. 
 391 Jon Minear, Your Licensor Has a License to Kill, and It May Be Yours: Why the Ninth Circuit Should 
Resist Bankruptcy Law That Threatens Intellectual Property Licensing Rights, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 107, 
133–34 (2007). 
 392 See Menell, supra note 15, at 780–81. 
 393 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202. 
 394 Id. at 3.  
 395 Id. 
 396 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 
F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985), superseded by statute, 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006); see also supra Part I.A. 
 397 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1. 
 398 See Menell, supra note 15, at 741. 
 399 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2. 
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IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LICENSES 
This Comment proposes three solutions to the problem of leaving 
intellectual property licenses vulnerable to potentially hostile foreign law in 
violation of the fundamental policy of the United States. Each proposed 
solution, by itself, would protect licensees and continue to promote the growth 
of intellectual property. First, courts should recognize that protecting 
intellectual property licenses qualifies as a fundamental policy of the United 
States and should invoke § 1506 whenever a foreign proceeding threatens 
those licenses. Second, Congress should amend § 1520 to automatically apply 
§ 365(n) in cases under chapter 15. Third, potential licensees should negotiate 
a choice of law clause in their licenses to ensure clarity as to which law will 
apply should the licensor go bankrupt. 
First and foremost, bankruptcy courts should find that protecting 
intellectual property licenses is a fundamental policy of the United States and 
should deny recognition of foreign proceedings under § 1506 when foreign law 
allows total rejection of the license. Section 1506 is a narrow grant of 
discretion meant to give United States courts the ability to protect public policy 
instead of granting recognition to a foreign proceeding. Every case to consider 
§ 1506 has affirmed that it should be interpreted narrowly and should only be 
invoked when foreign law is manifestly contrary to public policy.400 Both the 
Model Law and the House Report accompanying chapter 15 state that the 
inclusion of the word “manifestly” in the text of Article 6 and § 1506, 
respectively, “restricts the public policy exception to the most fundamental 
policies of the United States.”401 
The case law concerning § 1506 has not clearly demonstrated what makes a 
policy “fundamental,” but other United States case law has.402 Whether the 
justification is the intellectual property clause of the Constitution403 or the 
history and traditions of United States society, the policy of promoting 
intellectual property growth certainly falls within the definition of 
“fundamental” established by constitutional precedent.404 Further, because a 
 
 400 See, e.g., In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 401 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31(I), at 88 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172; see also MODEL LAW 
ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 3, at pt. 2, para. 89. 
 402 See supra Part III.A. 
 403 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 404 See supra Part III.A. 
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secure licensing market is necessary to promote intellectual property 
development, U.S. courts should hold that protecting intellectual property 
licenses is itself a fundamental policy. 
Given this fundamental policy, United States courts should use § 1506 to 
apply United States law, specifically § 365(n), to protect intellectual property 
licenses. Section 365(n) protects the essential purposes of a license: the 
licensee’s right to use the intellectual property405 and the licensor’s right to 
receive payments.406 Section 365(n) is how Congress chose to protect this 
fundamental policy within the Code;407 however, it is important to note that the 
fundamental policy is the protection of intellectual property licenses, which 
might not be fully enveloped within the bounds of § 365(n). If the court finds 
that the foreign proceeding otherwise protects the license or the licensee’s right 
to use the intellectual property, then the court would not need to deny 
recognition under § 1506.408 For instance, the foreign representative could 
petition the court under § 1521 to not apply § 365(n), if it can demonstrate that 
the licensee’s rights are protected by other means.409 However, if a foreign 
proceeding genuinely fails to protect intellectual property licenses, the United 
States court should deny recognition under § 1506. 
The second solution to prevent licensees from losing the right to use the 
intellectual property is for Congress to amend § 1520 to include § 365 
generally, or § 365(n) specifically. One of the most important purposes of 
chapter 15 is to foster “greater legal certainty for trade and investment,”410 and 
this solution would foster greater legal certainty regarding the status of 
intellectual property licenses in chapter 15 bankruptcies. The existing U.S. case 
law regarding international intellectual property licenses substantially 
undercuts that goal.411 It demonstrates that, even though courts should invoke 
§ 1506 to protect licenses from hostile foreign law, it is not at all clear that 
 
 405 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (2006). 
 406 Id. § 365(n)(2)(B). 
 407 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203.  
 408 See, e.g., RSM Richter Inc. v. Aguilar (In re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig.), 349 B.R. 333, 335–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that if a foreign proceeding offers comparable, if not wholly similar, protections of a 
fundamental policy, § 1506 does not apply). 
 409 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a) (“Upon recognition of a foreign, whether main or nonmain, where necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the 
court may, at the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief . . . .”). 
 410 Id. § 1501(a)(2). 
 411 See In re Qimonda AG, No. 09-14766-RGM, 2009 WL 4060083, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 19, 
2009) (granting recognition to a German proceeding that licensees feared might strip their licenses to use the 
debtor’s intellectual property), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
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courts would in fact do so. A court could find that advancing intellectual 
property development is not a fundamental policy despite its roots in both the 
Constitution and the history and traditions of the United States. Alternatively, a 
court could find that protecting licenses is not necessary to advancing 
intellectual property development despite licensing’s indispensibility in 
recouping investment costs, making a profit, and allowing revisions to the 
intellectual property by those best able to recognize possible weaknesses.412 
Potential licensees who note this uncertainty may choose not to contract or 
may demand an outright sale of the intellectual property, neither of which is an 
effective use of resources.413 However, if § 365(n) were to apply automatically 
upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, there would be no such uncertainty, 
and potential licensees would feel confident that their rights would be 
preserved even if the licensor were to go into bankruptcy. If allowing the 
debtor to completely reject the license would be in the debtor’s best interest, 
then the foreign representative could petition the court under §§ 1521 and 1522 
to stop § 365(n) from being applied.414 The court would grant the foreign 
representative’s request only if the representative showed that the interests of 
the creditor—the licensee, in this case—were sufficiently protected.415 Either 
way, this solution would ensure that a licensee’s rights were protected in the 
event of the licensor’s bankruptcy, thereby alleviating any potential harm to 
the licensing market. 
Amending the Code to automatically apply § 365(n) specifically, or § 365 
generally, in a chapter 15 case would not prevent a foreign court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over a foreign national debtor’s property wherever it 
is located. Further, when a U.S. court asserts the § 1506 policy exception, this 
does not substantially impair a foreign court’s jurisdiction over any debtor’s 
world-wide property. If that were the case, these suggestions would violate the 
fundamental policy of ensuring that the court must have jurisdiction over the 
debtor’s property, wherever held.416 Foreign debtors may still assume or reject 
licenses as they see fit, under either American law or their countries’ laws, and 
they may free themselves from having to perform burdensome affirmative acts 
under the licenses. However, they may not unilaterally prevent licensees from 
 
 412 See Menell, supra note 15, at 737–41.  
 413 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202–03. 
 414 11 U.S.C. §§ 1521(a), 1522 (allowing the court to grant “any appropriate relief” under § 1521 but 
restraining this power by only allowing the court to grant relief under § 1521 “if the interests of the creditors 
and other interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected”). 
 415 See id. § 1522(a)–(c). 
 416 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 372–73 (2009). 
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continuing to use the intellectual property merely by a rejection. While the 
suggested application of § 365(n) does somewhat limit a foreign debtor’s 
ability to reject an executory contract, such limitation is not fundamentally 
unfair. In fact, § 365(a) does not give a debtor plenary power to reject 
executory contracts but subjects that power to the court’s approval.417 
Similarly, limiting a foreign debtor’s rejection of a United States license does 
not prevent the debtor or the foreign court from exercising jurisdiction over the 
license, but instead properly protects the interest of the non-debtor party, the 
licensee, and the fundamental policies of the United States. 
Regardless of any future judicial or congressional action, potential 
intellectual property licensees already have two options to protect their rights if 
their licensor goes bankrupt. First, if a party is already a licensee and their 
licensor is a foreign company that has gone bankrupt, that party may be able to 
protect itself under § 1522.418 Section 1522 requires the court to grant or 
modify relief only if the interests of all related parties are protected.419 If a 
licensee risks losing his contractual right to use intellectual property, he could 
invoke § 1522 to guarantee that his rights are protected. This is not the most 
desirable option,420 but once the licensor is already in bankruptcy and his 
license is at risk, it provides an option for a licensee to try to protect his rights. 
Second, potential licensees can act affirmatively rather than rely on either 
Congress to act, or wait for the courts to act, once the licensor has declared 
bankruptcy. Potential licensees, when negotiating their license agreements, 
should include choice of law clauses to guarantee certainty about the nature of 
their rights should their licensors go into bankruptcy. This would allow United 
States courts to cooperate fully with foreign proceedings while avoiding 
potential harm to the fundamental policy of promoting the growth of 
intellectual property. It is important to note that such a contract provision is 
likely to stand up in court because the United States has a very strong policy of 
 
 417 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (providing that “the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject 
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor”). 
 418 Id. § 1522(a) (authorizing the courts in chapter 15 cases to “grant relief under [§] 1519 or 1521,  
or . . . modify or terminate relief under subsection (c), [but] only if the interests of the creditors and other 
interested entities, including the debtor, are sufficiently protected”). 
 419 Id. 
 420 The court could decide that the foreign proceeding sufficiently protects his interest even though he 
loses his license. See id. § 1522(a), (c) (allowing a court to order such relief if the interests are sufficiently 
protected). Alternatively, the court could hold that a general unsecured claim for damages under § 365(g) is 
sufficient to protect the licensee’s interest and that the debtor may therefore reject the license. See id. 
§§ 365(g), 1522(a), (c).  
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encouraging freedom of contract.421 Additionally, courts are unsympathetic to 
proceedings that violate contractual choice of law, and they need not recognize 
such judgments or proceedings.422 This would solve the problem of any 
possible uncertainty and encourage parties to protect their interests themselves 
without relying on the potential help of either the courts or Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 1506 provides a public policy exception that allows courts to refuse 
to recognize foreign proceedings when those proceedings would be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the United States. Prior to 2005, § 304(c) and 
the principle of international comity governed the issue of recognizing foreign 
proceedings. When § 1506 was adopted, it was intended to not only fit within 
the existing case law but also to restrict the situations in which comity could be 
denied. Both the Senate Report accompanying the passage of § 1506 and the 
Model Law that inspired the statute demonstrate that this exception should be 
construed much more narrowly than was § 304. Courts that have considered 
§ 1506 have done just that by consistently holding that they can deny 
recognition of a foreign proceeding only when recognizing the proceeding 
would violate a fundamental policy of the United States. 
Despite a lack of cases to date defining precisely what “fundamental” 
means with respect to § 1506, there is considerable case law outside of 
bankruptcy that defines “fundamental” within the context of individual rights. 
Courts may look to the original meaning of the Constitution to determine 
whether something is “fundamental,” or they may look to the history and 
traditions of the United States. In terms of U.S. policies, promoting intellectual 
property growth and development is clearly “fundamental” regardless of the 
approach. The United States has a fundamental interest in promoting 
intellectual property development and the economic, scientific, and artistic 
benefits that it brings to society. Licensing plays a crucial role in this process 
and is a necessary means for incentivizing investment in such productive 
activities. Therefore, encouraging and protecting a robust licensing market 
 
 421 For example, the Contracts Clause of the Constitution explicitly prohibits states from interfering with 
valid contracts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. One could even say that freedom of contract is a fundamental 
policy of the United States because it is clearly implied from the text of the Constitution. However, that 
argument is best left for another article. 
 422 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (1971) (amended 1988) (providing 
that, subject to two narrow exceptions, the law of the state chosen by the parties will “govern their contractual 
rights and duties”). 
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must also be a fundamental policy of the United States. However, U.S. 
bankruptcy law currently fails to protect such intellectual property licenses 
when the law of the foreign proceeding could allow the debtor to completely 
reject them. Either the courts or Congress should pursue the solutions 
suggested by this Comment to remedy the problem; in the interim, individual 
parties should include a choice of law clause to protect their license rights. 
Promoting the advancement of science and technology is a fundamental 
policy of the United States, but the increasingly international nature of the 
American economy threatens to substantially weaken the “Progress of Science 
and [the] useful Arts”423 in America. The United States must make changes to 
its international bankruptcy law to protect intellectual property licenses, even 
in a chapter 15 bankruptcy proceeding. With such protections in place, the 
United States can continue to pursue its fundamental policy of promoting 
technological innovation. 
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